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Abstract 
 
Rising global opinions on security of vulnerable nuclear materials at research reactor facilities 
against misuse and acquisition by terrorist or violent groups has led to the implementation of the 
enrichment reduction program focused at reducing enrichment in fuel from about 90% to less 
than 20%. This program has provided an extraordinary prospect of improving international 
security to counter the fears of direct use of HEU materials acquired from these facilities for non-
peaceful purposes. Ongoing efforts by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) through 
the Reduced Enrichment in Test and Research Reactors (RETRR) and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) supports countries to develop and adapt better technical capabilities 
targeted towards this program. This research enumerated and compared the amount of weapon-
usable materials that the reactor produced in both the HEU and LEU fuel at varying time 
intervals of operation from a simulated neutronic model of the Nigeria Research Reactor (NIRR-
1) developed with SCALE and ORIGEN code. Consequently, result obtained showed that 
weapon-usable 239Pu balance for LEU fuel compared to HEU increased linearly about 10-fold as 
the number of days of operation increases. This 239Pu growth was strongly considered for the 
ongoing conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) as a case study because of 
the concern that out of the nine licensed prototype MNSR worldwide, four are in China, the 
origin of the design but the other five are in Ghana, Iran, Nigeria Pakistan and Syria. These five 
countries have well organized terrorist or violent groups that could potentially acquire nuclear 
materials or sabotage these facilities to disperse radiological materials which should be a call to 
more action for more security as well as international safeguards and accounting for nuclear 
materials. Additionally, based on the outcome of this simulation, as well as the vulnerability 
assessment carried out that included seeming capabilities of terrorist groups operating near the 
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NIRR-1 facility, security risk and safeguards were evaluated, and suggestions were made on 
security risk of the increasing quantity of weapon-usable 239Pu isotope. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The global resolve to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and the eventual 
elimination of such material from research reactors altogether is seen as an approach at reducing 
risk and the perceived possibility that nuclear materials from one or more of these research 
reactor facilities may one day be advertently acquired and used by any terrorist group known or 
operating on a global pedestal [1] to produce nuclear weapon or construct a radiological dispersal 
device (RDD). Though, the use of HEU in research and test reactors has raised security concerns, 
even though they are considerably smaller in terms of power and waste generation than power 
reactors [2] [3]. Beside the security concerns, research reactors are considerably smaller in terms 
of energy output, operation, and waste generation [4], but there have been concerns due to the 
extent of security and safeguards applicable to nuclear materials and the facilities globally 
compared to those obtainable at power reactor facilities. Nevertheless, under the IAEA guidance, 
[5]  it is a requirement that all member states must implement relevant and objective measures to 
secure, safeguard, and counter all credible perceived risks of non-peaceful application of nuclear 
technologies and associated materials in all its ramifications. This includes efforts by the agency 
to support, develop, and adapt better technical capabilities targeted towards converting all HEU 
fueled reactors with lower enriched uranium (LEU) fuels of less than 20% enrichment. HEU is 
defined as the uranium type in which the isotopic concentration of 235U is 20% or higher (natural 
uranium ore consists of 0.7% 235U) [6]. The term research reactor includes critical and subcritical 
facilities [7] used in stimulation and measurement of effects of radiation on metals in the nuclear 
rocket environment [8], generation and production of neutron flux, ionizing radiation and related 
experimental instruments [9]. 239Pu is the most suitable isotope used in weapon production [10], 
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the isotope is produced by transmutation of 238U isotope that is exposed to neutron radiation at 
lower kinetic energy. The 238U is subjected to two 𝛽ˉ decays, and as the isotope loses electron, 
the initial 𝛽ˉ decay transmutes the 239Pu isotope to 239Np while the second 𝛽ˉ transmutes the 
239Np into 239Pu [10].  
 
𝑈92
238   +   𝑛0
1  → 𝑈92
239  →  𝑁𝑝92
239  → 𝑃𝑢92
239      equation 1.1 
 
 
Meanwhile, the core of the NIRR-1 MNSR is projected to be converted to LEU fuel with UO2 
Zircalloy, it is expected that the initial 9.0 wt% of 238U isotopic content in the HEU fuel will 
substantially increase to about 87.05 wt% in the UO2. As it is anticipated, the reasonable amount 
of 238U isotope present in the LEU fuel matrix can produce plutonium isotopes including the 
240Pu, but when the quantity of 240Pu exceeds 7% measure of the total plutonium isotope, such 
matrix is said to be bad and not good enough weapon material.  
Correspondingly, the vulnerability and proliferation of nuclear materials in research and test 
reactors can be exploited due to the high volume of 239Pu that may be produced in the spent fuel 
from such a facility by any proliferant state. In view of the vulnerability evaluation of research 
reactor facilities as mostly located in developing countries like Nigeria, it may as well attract a 
very high consequence in terms of environmental hazard from the fall-out of radioactive 
dispersal in case of attack by violent or terrorist groups, since 239Pu produces high and energetic 
radioactivity with a half-life of 24100 years.  
Furthermore, the production of high-purity weapon-usable 239Pu metal grade is best when lower 
enriched fuel is exposed for a few days of reactor operation, after which the chemical separation 
methodology process could be used to separate the 239Pu from the other elements [10]. It is 
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worthy to note that even though the NIRR-1 MNSR facility used as a case study is a compact 
core model, the production of 239Pu from a lower enriched fuel is still technically a well-
intentioned subject matter since the research reactor operates an average of 2.5 hours per day 
every week. This situation puts the facility in the class of reactor that can produce more amount 
of high-purity weapon-usable 239Pu metal grade based on the quantity of 238U present in 
candidate LEU fuel. 
 
1.1 General Concept and Approach for Safeguards and Security of Nuclear 
Materials 
The international safeguards application takes measures to prevent the spread, and timely 
detection in case of theft or diversion, of a significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear materials through 
full implementation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) agreement. This has been one of the 
cardinal objectives of the IAEA international safeguards and verification regime. The IAEA 
makes sure that all commitments to the NPT agreement are adhered to by verification and 
safeguards of nuclear materials and technology to accomplish nuclear disarmament. The NPT 
agreement came into force in 1970 and has been ratified by 190 state parties with the 
responsibility to promote strict adherence to the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear 
materials. Accordingly, Article III of the NPT requires the applicability of the IAEA safeguards 
to all sources or special fissionable materials within the member state’s territory, jurisdiction, 
and control [11]. For all IAEA safeguards and verification, complying with the requirements 
may also involve measures to fulfil the Additional Protocol (AP) if it was ratified by the state. 
This measure entails the collection of design information and environmental samples at different 
locations even beyond the facility [11] as deemed fit by the inspectors.  
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Establishing the inventory and having full knowledge of the strength of materials and the facility 
under the IAEA safeguards is of the utmost importance to all the cardinal oversite of the agency. 
The information on elements and their isotopes contained in the inventory is referred to as the 
source term, and this presents a gateway to understanding the extent, needed level(s) of 
protection, vulnerabilities, and safety of operations needed at any facility. Besides the 
importance of the source term to safeguards, the IAEA guidance and Safety Report Series No. 53 
also recommends that it is important to analyze and determine the source term including its 
radiological consequences for all nuclear and radiological facilities to guarantee safety of people, 
materials, and the environment [4].  
 
1.2 Limitations of existing control and accountability for safeguards and security 
of nuclear materials in research reactors 
The IAEA verifies compliance to safeguards using non-destructive assay to corroborate all 
reactor data provided by the facility through the state, as well as physical inspection at intervals 
for inventory of different nuclear materials. A state proliferating or planning to proliferate may 
hide data from inventory transmitted to the IAEA. 
Beside the application of international safeguards as a measure of compliance to the protection of 
nuclear materials and facilities, varieties of strategies have been proposed centered around 
enrichment reduction. Nevertheless, material attractiveness at lower enrichment may increase 
due to enrichment reduction. Non-state actors with less capability but with the intention of 
creating panic, disrupting, or acquiring materials to produce RDD, may easily be attracted to the 
facility. The attempt to divert materials by disgruntled personnel may also increase due to the 
perceived lowering of risk associated with the new enrichment. 
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There is also increasing concern that most strategies put forward by DOE, IAEA, and other 
stakeholders failed to place emphasis on the risk some of these facilities face operating in certain 
regions of the globe irrespective of the level of enrichment obtainable in those facilities. 
Consideration of the role that human elements play in security, risk mitigation, and management 
will be an asset to global security. Furthermore, the express understanding of uniqueness in 
culture in terms of tradition, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, religious beliefs, administrative 
process, administration of justice system, policy, and legal framework that supports the 
sustenance of global strategies in these regions will go further to appreciate facility risks and 
other misunderstandings. 
But there are concerns about assigning strategic value to the risk at all levels of enrichment and 
the notion that such material becomes more attractive even at lower enrichments, which now 
raises more concerns about material vulnerabilities attributes attached to nuclear materials at 
different enrichment levels and projected elevated proliferation risks as the fuel transits from 
HEU to LEU. According to a “Risk Metric” developed by Glaser which established that “very 
roughly, a reduction of the fuel enrichment from 93 % to 45 % cuts the attractiveness by about 
40 %, while a reduction from 93 % to 20 % cuts the attractiveness by almost 70 %, compared 
to W-HEU,” as well as the fact that the technical requirements will make it practically 
impossible to manufacture nuclear weapons at enrichment levels below 20% [12].  The Glaser 
metric, however, failed to evaluate the increase in weapon-usable 239Pu in LEU fuel materials 
after reducing the enrichment from 93% to 20% as well as the justification of the scale of 
difference in the 239Pu balance between HEU and LEU.  
The enrichment reduction program has provided an extraordinary prospect of improving 
international security as well as relieving the fears of direct use of HEU materials acquired from 
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these research reactors for non-peaceful purposes. However, bearing in mind the increase in 238U 
isotopic content in HEU from 9.0 wt% to 87.05 wt% in LEU and the fact that this noticeable 
increase will give rise to weapon-usable 239Pu in spent fuel of the LEU should be a big source of 
concern for the enrichment reduction program as well as international safeguards and accounting 
for nuclear materials. 
Granting the understanding that technical requirements will make it nearly impossible to 
manufacture nuclear weapons as enrichments reduces farther below 20%. At this point, it may be 
easy to assume that reducing fuel enrichment from 93% to 20% cuts the material attractiveness 
by almost 70%, but, alternatively, it is also believed that reduced enrichment may warrant lesser 
or easier adversary capabilities to obtain nuclear materials as the extent of required safety and 
security protocols for such materials diminishes. Cutting material attractiveness by almost 70% 
will not eliminate in entirety the possibility that material could be accessed in whatever form or 
shape by (i) a disgruntled employee acting for self or in collusion with an outsider, (ii) a terrorist 
invasion of susceptible secured facility and (iii) other material vulnerabilities.  
Nonetheless, to an adversary or non-state actor, obtaining materials in any form or shape and 
accessing or disrupting facility operations with the attendant media attention is a success. To 
date, widely held global opinions on security of vulnerable nuclear materials at the research 
reactor facilities from misuse and acquisition by terrorist organizations worldwide has led to the 
implementation of the conversion program focused on reducing the enrichment in fuel from 
about 90% to less than 20%. Since the conversion program is an extensively accepted initiative 
worldwide, all the requisite risk assessment, material attractiveness, and vulnerabilities 
associated with each materials type, enrichment, facility, location, and the general adherence to 
both national and international regulations on material control and accounting for all levels of 
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enrichment should be standardized to the extent practical when planning or implementing global 
nuclear material security.  
Essentially, risk and material attractiveness, including their figure of merit (FOM), must be 
assigned to materials based on local, regional, and international threats to each facility. 
Additionally, more comprehensive methodologies, as well as adequate information gathering 
techniques for benchmarking procedures that cuts across the conduct for safety, security and 
safeguard for the stockpiled vulnerable nuclear materials at research reactor facilities worldwide, 
must established as a means of promoting global nuclear materials security. 
The safeguard and security objectives in the context of this research are expected to develop 
capabilities that helps to avert the stealing or diversion of nuclear material, compare risk inherent 
in the reduced enrichment, as well as the safety of personnel and environment within and outside 
of the research reactor facility through the inventory of source term that will be obtained by 
utilizing the Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration (ORIGEN) capabilities in the Standardized 
Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) code suite.  
 
1.3 Importance of source term inventory to international safeguards and security 
of nuclear materials for research reactors 
Nuclear materials inventories are measured using different techniques like counting physical 
items, detectors, on-site measurements, analysis of environmental samples, and many more [13]. 
Nevertheless, the enumerated techniques may not be enough to prevent clandestine operations by 
any facility when a total commitment and proof of adherence to international safeguards, 
including securing nuclear materials against clandestine operations, is desirable. 
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Apart from the importance of source term inventory to safeguards and security, the acquisition 
and potential threat of dispersal of small amounts of plutonium in the air in the form of dust or 
aerosol by an adversary or terrorist group would be politically and economically impactful 
without the fore-knowledge of its radiotoxicity and characteristics that can inform emergency 
response and the eventual clean-up. 
A more detailed source term inventory, then, becomes very important and strategic to the 
ongoing conversion programs worldwide. The inventory will provide more detailed elemental 
and isotopic parameters that could make diversions, deviations, or accidents more easily 
detectable when further environmental and elemental analysis are carried out. Source term is the 
quantity of radioactive material expected to be released during normal reactor operations. It is 
reported on a per isotope basis, and the knowledge plays a critical role in safety analysis of 
reactors during and after normal operations. The extent, composition, and pattern of activity 
release can be simulated under different conditions to understand the degree of challenges that 
radiological hazards may present [14], or to detect any deviation from normal operations that 
may lead to non-peaceful application. Additionally, the conduct and evaluation of source term is 
a requirement to establish a national system of control, accounting, emergency response plan, 
and safety and security of nuclear materials. Furthermore, it is used for the conduct and 
postulation of radioactive releases for design base accident (DBA) analysis. The information 
contained in the analysis can provide evidence of operational consistency or otherwise when 
compared with initial information provided by state or facility during on-site or off-site 
evaluations of trace elements in environmental samples, as well as during accident analysis.  
For research reactors, the knowledge of source term became very significant in safeguards and 
security of materials because of the several irradiation channels in the design that could 
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accommodate clandestine and undeclared materials processing. Even though international 
safeguards permit the use of the tamper indicating device (TID) for facilities under the IAEA 
safeguards, it is challenging to have TIDs on the all the irradiation channels for regulatory 
oversite.  Additionally, the usage patterns of research reactors are much less regular than power-
producing reactors, which complicates analyses. 
Nigeria is one of the countries operating an HEU fueled research reactor. The reactor is a 
Chinese manufactured MNSR that can produce weapon grade material, though in a very small 
quantity. The Nigeria Research Reactor (called NIRR-1) is undergoing conversion from HEU 
(UA14-A1) to LEU (UO2, Zircalloy). The conduct and evaluation of source term and inventories 
for NIRR-1 are very significant for operational safety, amendment of legislation, and the 
eventual renewal of the operating license of the new LEU fuel. Additionally, the evaluation of 
source term from the NIRR-1 facility will reveal the composition pattern of radioactivity release 
under different conditions that can help plan for the readiness and the prevention of radiological 
hazards as the HEU core is removed from the reactor. The knowledge of source term inventory 
will help develop the HEU core shielding with the respective safeguard’s expectation for storage 
and secure transportation of unirradiated and irradiated HEU at the end of the present HEU core 
life. 
 
1.4 Background 
According to the IAEA database shown in (Figure 1.1), there are about 273 research reactors in 
59 countries around the world used for teaching and training purposes; there are 14 sited in 
Africa and they are expected to continue to play a leading role in advancement as well as 
improvement of human wellbeing [15]. Additionally, they will remain influential to the growth 
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of nuclear technology use in agriculture engineering [16], education and training, basic science, 
materials development, and radioisotope production for medicine, industry, computer code 
validation, elemental analyses, and radiochemistry [17] [18] [19] [20]. The term research reactor 
includes critical and subcritical facilities [7] used in stimulation and measurement of effects of 
radiation on metals in the nuclear rocket environment [8]. 
Globally, the direct impact of utilization of research reactors are seen in the expansion of basic 
scientific systems, advancement, and enactment of viable research and technology policies that 
supports the transition of breakthrough from theory to reality. Research reactors are also used to 
generate neutron flux as well as experimental radiation for research and development [21]. A 
typical research reactor core has a small volume with powers less than 5 MW(t). In most cases, 
research reactors utilize higher fuel enrichments than typical power reactors [22]. Some of the 
reactors operate with HEU fuel that may be as high as 93% and are cooled by natural or forced 
cooling with pulsing capability. Their challenges range from housing stockpiles of both 
unirradiated and irradiated HEU materials with quantities ranging from grams (g) to metric tons 
(MTU) [23] and the need to have a credible ability to secure these nuclear materials.  
Aside from the earlier efforts by the US and the IAEA to assist in providing technical capabilities 
to reduce enrichment levels in research reactor utilization, the importance of total elimination 
became obvious after the September 2001 terrorist attacks [24], and thereafter the inquest and 
increase by terrorist group seeking nuclear materials for malevolent acts. In addition to the 
efforts by the RERTR program, the National Academy of Science (NAS) recently published two 
reports to review the status of HEU to LEU conversion for both reactor fuel and targets:  1) 
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“Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,”1 and 2) 
“Molybdenum-99 for medical imaging”2 These studies revealed that conversion of research 
reactors has the potential to improve performance understanding of the operating characteristics3, 
contribute to further decision-making processes on the scientific evaluation, and most 
importantly, reduce proliferation risk4.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. IAEA database of Research Reactors 
Source: [15]   
 
 
 
                                                          
1 “Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,” Committee on the Current Status 
of and Progress Toward Eliminating Highly Enriched Uranium Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors, 
National Academy of Sciences, March 2016 
2 “Molybdenum-99 for Medical Imaging,” Committee on State of Molybdenum-99 Production and Utilization 
and Progress Toward Eliminating Use of Highly Enriched Uranium, National Academy of Sciences, October 2016 
3 “National Research Council, Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities for Converting U.S. and Russian Research 
Reactors, Washington D.C: National Academies Press, 2012.  
4 Schickler, R. A., W. R. Marcum, and S. R. Reese. "Comparison of HEU and LEU neutron spectra in irradiation 
facilities at the Oregon State TRIGA® Reactor." Nuclear Engineering and Design 262 (2013): 340-349. 
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1.5 Study goals and objectives 
The objectives of this research are aimed at setting international standards of evaluation in 
measuring security, risk and material attractiveness, and threat assessment. Presently, no existing 
confirmation measurements have been conducted to evaluate or confirm the NIRR-1 source term 
inventories. Hence, the operational source term of the facility will be simulated for postulated 
accidental release of radionuclides from an MNSR using the NIRR-1 as a study facility. These 
objectives will be achieved by performing the reactor physics analysis to evaluate the threats, 
dose calculations, burnup, and power distribution for security and safeguards of materials, 
including its implications for storage and transportation using SCALE and ORIGEN Monte 
Carlo code.  
For this research, further emphasis is placed on using the TRITON tool of the SCALE code to 
understand the strength of the postulated inventory of releases and how it will affect technical 
requirements for assuring that the state has not embarked on a clandestine activity, or for an 
adversary to acquire nuclear materials from the facility. The result from the SCALE simulation 
will also be applied to developing an acquisition pathway analysis (APA) which is a requirement 
for designing a state level approach (SLA) to safeguards. 
Apart from the Glaser risk metric, the capabilities, strength, and mode of operation of non-state 
actors within Nigeria and the region based on the past and present activities will be used to 
develop risk and material attractiveness to address the vital question of an appraised value of risk 
or attractiveness of nuclear materials, specifically at less than 20% enrichment at the NIRR-1 
facility.  
The schematic diagram of a typical MNSR and the various parts as are shown in (Figure 1.2) 1. 
Reactor vessel, 2. Reactor Base, 3. Lower Orifice, 4. Bottom Reflector, 5. Annular Reflector, 6. 
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Upper Orifice, 7. Upper Shim tray, 8. Lower Grid plate, 9. Fuel Elements, 10. Upper Grid plates, 
11. Tie Rods, 12. Control Rods, 13. Control Rod clad, 14. Inner Irradiation site, 15. Outer 
Irradiation site, 16. Reactivity Regulator, 17. Core cover 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The schematic isometric diagram of a typical MNSR 
              Source: [25] 
 
 
1.6 Research justification and study benefits 
During normal operations, radioactive fission products accumulate in the primary coolant 
systems, pipes, and pumps, as well as in the contamination on exterior cladding material with 
fission trace uranium. It becomes important to postulate the extent that radioactive contamination 
and possible on-site exposure could potentially lead to severe deterministic effects (death) or off-
site ground contamination that could affect the public and the environment. Besides this, 
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postulating accident and unexpected initiating events from inventory of source term can help 
prepare for any unexpected accidents as the core of the NIRR-1 is removed and transported back 
to the manufacturer in China. On the other hand, the conversion program is expected to bring 
about a new safeguards challenge that this research will equally address as an important 
component of international security. The IAEA safeguards program was established as part of 
the international security architecture to detect the diversion of significant quantities of fissile 
nuclear materials against purposeful non-peaceful usage to produce nuclear weapons and 
explosives as well as radiological dispersal devices [26].  
When accounting for nuclear materials, a potential weakness is inadvertent or deliberate gross 
over/under estimation of nuclear materials depending on the analytical methods used. The 
methodology applied for the accounting of plutonium balance and elemental source term 
evaluation, as well as the risk analysis in this research, will benefit the IAEA and give credible 
assurance of peaceful and protected core conversion, as well as the assurance of the ability to 
adhere to nuclear safeguards, NPT and pragmatic verification of design, and nuclear materials in 
Nigeria. 
Equally, the completion of this research will provide answers to the following fundamental 
safeguards questions to draw conclusions and accomplish the set objectives of this work: 
▪ What are the additional verification challenges to be faced by the NIRR-1 facility due to 
the HEU core removal and the new LEU core replacement, considering the reactor 
operating data history including storage of fuel materials? 
▪ What quantity of plutonium will be left at the NIRR-1 facility after the conversion and 
how is such being accounted for? 
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▪ What are the international and domestic safeguards protocols to be met by the NIRR-1 
facility for verification and regulatory oversite? 
▪ What significant changes will the conversion have on the application of safeguards and 
material accounting within the facility and country at large? 
▪ What are the potential proliferation risks and theft pathways in the ongoing conversion 
process and the probability of detection by either the facility or IAEA in case of theft or 
malicious attempt? 
▪ What are the potential inventory management issues and regulatory challenges due to the 
conversion? 
▪ What are the new safeguards challenges based on the sensitivity and uncertainty 
measurements of nuclear data for the NIRR-1 facility safeguards? 
▪ What are the probable scenarios that should be used as guidelines to accomplish when 
designing State Level Approach (SLA) for the HEU, as well as the candidate LEU? 
▪ What are the safeguards measures in place for continuous monitoring and storage of 
spent fuel? 
▪ What are the safeguards methodologies in place to check undeclared irradiation or 
potential intent of diversion of spent fuel elements? 
▪ What are the safeguards protocols in place for the eventual repatriation of the HEU fuel 
to its origin? 
Nigeria is a signatory to the NPT for the universal, total, and irreversible elimination of nuclear 
weapons [27].  Well-understood source term inventories can be used as a tool for assurance that 
Nigeria’s nuclear program follows the international verification regime. Based on the inventory, 
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any unrelated radioactivity detection can indicate that a facility is potentially involved in a 
clandestine operation or activity.  
The inventory result from this research is expected to provide a resource of basic information 
needed for the shielding calculation for core removal, storage, and transportation. A more 
detailed elemental and isotope outline that could make diversions, deviations, or accidents easily 
detectable based on the inventory data will be evaluated. It also provides the IAEA and national 
regulators baseline ideas of elemental expectation from facility operations when further 
environmental analysis is required. In addition, the evaluation of source term from the NIRR-1 
facility will reveal the composition and postulated pattern of radioactivity release under different 
conditions that can help plan for the readiness and the prevention of radiological hazards as the 
HEU core is removed from the reactor. 
Some of the existing MNSRs operate in countries (e.g. Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan) where 
ongoing conflicts or security challenges of deadly terrorist groups have become a serious global 
concern. Moving forward, all countries like Nigeria operating research reactors must be able to 
demonstrate that the country can provide adequate security assurance using the research reactor 
as a measure of the ability to fulfill the requirements in the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS) 
19 implementation guide. Furthermore, the guide stipulates security as a crucial requirement for 
state level nuclear program and all Member States must ensure that nuclear and radioactive 
materials are protected from people with malicious, criminal, and terrorist, as well as those with 
intentions to sabotage, within the facility and during transportation [28]. 
Therefore, burnup simulations for both HEU and LEU will provide information on the expected 
plutonium balance at different power levels to ascertain the quantity of plutonium expected from 
facility operations per period. At the same time, the proposed LEU will require an increase in 
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normal operating power from 30kw in HEU (UA14-A1) to 34kw in LEU (UO2, Zircalloy) to have 
an equivalent flux [29]. The data from the burn-up will be used to assess the worth of the 
conversion process for MNSRs based on the plutonium balance, as well as rationalize the need to 
develop facility-specific risk and material attractiveness including their figure of merit (FOM) 
based on a global standard, while still recognizing local, regional, and international threat 
assessments of each facility devoid of general assumption. At the completion of this research, the 
idea generated will be used as a training support and complement to the ongoing efforts by the 
DOE and IAEA with subject matter contribution to the enrichment reduction program.  
  
1.7 Methodology 
Many computational tools have been used to simulate the likelihood of radiological release into 
the reactor containment and the environment, as well as to generate data for the verification of 
facility operations. But each tool presents different challenges about accuracy, and this is a 
limitation for the precision of output needed for the overall objectives of the conversion program. 
Evaluation of source term involves efforts in tracking several core physics parameters, 
operational times, and enrichment levels.  
In this research, the ORIGEN capabilities of the SCALE code suite were employed to carry out 
reactor physics analysis and to generate the core inventory of source term for both the HEU and 
the candidate LEU. Dose calculations, plutonium balance, burnup, and power distribution 
important for safeguards were carried out using the Transport Rigor Implemented with Time-
dependent Operation for Neutronic depletion (TRITON) code. 
Even though the engineering and design drawings of the facility were not available, an MCNP 
input deck created at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) as part of the effort to convert the 
NIRR-1 core from HEU to LEU was obtained through a private communication and used as a 
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guide to develop a new SCALE input used in this research. The choice of SCALE suite is based 
on its ability to generate Keff more precisely and with more accuracy than [30] MCNP. 
Using the MCNP input as the starting point, a computational SCALE model was initiated on 
Graphically Enhanced Editing Wizard (GeeWiz) platform of the SCALE 6.1. version. This 
version of SCALE was chosen for the initial code development due to the availability of the 
windows user interface, its user friendliness, and its ease of navigation to new code users.  The 
windows interface allows a step-by-step data input in a form format that can be viewed in a 3-
dimesional output that helps visualize complete shape of input geometry. The input file from 
GeeWiz was opened in Fulcrum, a component of SCALE 6.2.3 suite, available with a graphical 
user interface (GUI) that provides a modular workspace which allows the user to drag-and-drop 
files. The autocompletion feature in Fulcrum helps to determine quick visual input, though the 
present version of SCALE only offers a 2-dimesional view of geometry. 
The results obtained at various levels were analyzed and used to develop risk and material 
attractiveness and recommendations for implementing the outcomes of the research and future 
works. 
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Chapter 2 
 
REACTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE NIRR-1 
 
2.1 Description of the Nigeria Research Reactor 
The Nigeria Research Reactor NIRR-1 is operated by the Center for Energy Research and 
Training (CERT), Zaria, Nigeria. The reactor is a Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) 
licensed to operate at 31.1KW thermal power and 1.2 x 1012 neutron flux (n/cm2/s). The reactor 
is a tank-in-pool type reactor with light water as moderator and coolant, and with metallic 
beryllium as a reflector. The reactor has a rated design of a maximum of 4.5 hours  per day at full 
power [31], although it is operated for 2.5 hours daily for 5 days per week [32]. 
The NIRR – 1 fuel is an HEU UA14-A1 enriched at 90% with a burnup estimate of less than 1% 
of fuel after 200 days of operation, corresponding to 11 years [33]. The depletion of fuel and 
control of excess reactivity for the NIRR – 1 operation is done by the addition of Beryllium shim 
plates to maintain the reactivity worth (mk) at 4mk at the beginning of operation [33] [34]. The 
core of the reactor is a 230 mm x 230 mm square cylinder with 347 fuel pins and three Al 
dummies in the fuel lattice [35] [36]. Each fuel pin consists of 2.88g of 235U loading with 1 
central control rod (CD) and made up of 266 mm long cadmium absorber, 3.9 mm in diameter, 
covered with stainless steel 0.5mm thick [29]. The NIRR-1 is presently used for neutron 
activation analysis (NAA), research, soil elemental analysis for agriculture, identification of solid 
minerals, and training, but the conversion to LEU is expected to improve the operational 
performance to production of radioisotopes for cancer treatment as well as developing 
competencies towards the Nigeria nuclear power program. Nigeria has received support under 
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the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) for the conversion of the NIRR-1 fuel from HEU 
to LEU as well as the RERTR program. 
 
2.2 The NIRR-1 Core Design 
The NIRR-1 core is made up of a 350-lattice position space, out of which 347 are fuel elements 
containing UA14-A1 enriched at 90% and covered in an aluminum cladding while the remaining 
lattice positions are made of dummy aluminum elements laid out in 10 organized cylindrical 
formations of varying diameter in the fuel cage and surrounded by an annular beryllium 
reflector. The cage is covered by a top shim tray of beryllium as well as another beryllium 
reflector below the cage.  The fuel cage is held together by 2 grid plates, each placed above and 
below the cage, as well as 4 number tie-rods and the guide tube that controls the control rod 
movement.  
 
2.3 Proposed LEU core design  
An initial design specification for the candidate LEU core was initiated by a group of experts and 
coordinated by the IAEA with a preliminary enrichment benchmarked at 12.5% by simulating 
the reactor’s design parameters such that there would be approximately the same number of fuel 
rods, water fissile ratios, negative reactivity, and power coefficients that will compensate for the 
expected penalties of core replacement [37]. Apart from this initial specification, several other 
experts have engaged the use of different computer codes to simulate the LEU core replacement. 
Previous computational studies have suggested that a 19.75% UO2 [38], as well as U3Si, U3Si2, 
and U9Mo [39] fuel, will be a good replacement for the present HEU core and can appropriately 
match the parameters of the present HEU after the conversion. A Generic Base parameter for 
both the HEU (UAl alloy) versus LEU (UO2) candidate fuel is enumerated in Appendix 1 
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Nonetheless, the generic number of LEU fuel is 348, and this work utilized 347 in reference to 
the SAR for NIRR-1. As well, (Table 2.1.) highlights the uranium isotopic for both the HEU 
(UAl alloy) and the LEU (UO2) candidate fuel. 
Due to the difference in thermal power between the HEU at 30 Kw and the LEU at 34 Kw, the 
increment in the macroscopic cross section of fission is inevitable with a constant flux and core 
volume to pay for the penalty of conversion depicted by Equation 2.0. 
 
𝑃 =
∅𝑡ℎ 𝛴𝑓𝑉
3⋅12×1010
𝑓ⅈ𝑠𝑠ⅈ𝑜𝑛
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑒𝑐
                equation 2.0 
where, 
P = Power 
∅𝑡ℎ = thermal neutron flux 
𝛴𝑓 = the macroscopic cross section of fission 
𝑉 = the core volume 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Uranium isotopic for both the HEU (UAl alloy) and the LEU (UO2) candidate fuel 
pins 
Uranium Isotopes HEU (wt%) LEU (wt%) 
235U 90.0 12.5 
238U 9.0 87.05 
234U 1.0 0.2 
236U 0.0 0.25 
Total 100 100 
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Chapter 3 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Preliminary Conversion Concept  
This research took advantage of several literatures, methodologies, and processes previously 
established on research reactor enrichment reduction to establish the importance of further 
benchmarking the codes used in simulating postulated accidents, as well as the need to update 
security and safeguards requirements at these facilities in accordance with the threat level 
identified from the facility assessment. A greater amount of the existing literature laid more 
emphasis on safety of these reactors during conversion and the implementation of adequate 
protection when HEU is converted or reduced to LEU. But, according to the IAEA, an aspect of 
state’s fulfilment of international obligations is the protection of personnel and the environment 
from exposure to the harmful effects of radiation including safety practices in all its 
ramifications, whereas security as a state international obligation seek to prevent, detect, and 
protect nuclear facilities and nuclear and radiological materials from theft, sabotage, and 
unauthorized access. 
Source terms and the quantity of radioactive materials expected to be released into the 
environment during normal and shutdown operations on a per isotope basis is one of the most 
important technical projections of the conversion program. This research was able to identify and 
review challenges from previous literature about university-based research reactor conversion 
programs, especially simulated events concerning γ, α, and β radiation, as well as postulated 
challenges that may arise in prospective detonation of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) like 
60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 192Ir, 238Pu, 241Am, and 252Cf produced from medical and industrial isotopes 
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[40]. Any of the sources listed above may be obtained by terrorist or malicious personnel but 
acknowledging the strength of damage from the sources with high activity content is important to 
the facility level security awareness and planning. 
New ideas were generated based on these reviews which further laid credence to the need to 
consider security of nuclear materials even at enrichment below 20% that could be denoted as 
LEU. In addition, a new methodology for benchmarking parameters for all levels of enrichment 
reduction that looked outside safety to a more engaging security and safeguards of nuclear 
materials, mostly in regions of the world where definable threats exist, that could result in 
proliferation or malicious use of nuclear material was developed.   
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was the first to carry out the viability of a 
replacement LEU for research reactors with the conversion of the Oak Ridge Research Reactor 
(ORR) in 1987 using the mixed-core approach [41]. After this, several operating research 
reactors have been converted from HEU to LEU. More than a few methodologies and codes have 
been used to postulate operational safety of nuclear materials for various conversion activities, 
and the deployment of these codes and methodologies have also helped to identify conceptual 
challenges from the obtained results necessitating further studies.  
The conversion of research reactors is based on comparing the operating parameters of HEU 
with a matching LEU substitute, as well as meeting all required regulatory standards including 
facility specific commitment to the safety, safeguards, and security for both the unirradiated and 
irradiated fuel. Equally, the projected fuel replacement must be estimated comparing the data of 
both mass per element ratio and enrichment ratio. Conversion of the research reactor increases 
the 238U content which is the dominant isotope in LEU, the difference in the weight fraction, as 
well as the nuclear cross sections and the reactor power must be compensated for. This gap is 
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referred to as the “penalty factor” and denoted as fpenalty. This factor varies in different reactors 
but is generally between 1.2 – 2.0. 
 
The ratio of mass per element is defined as:  
𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑈
𝑀𝐻𝐸𝑈
    ……………………………………………. equation 3.0 
where, 𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑈  = mass of LEU 
 𝑀𝐻𝐸𝑈  = mass of HEU 
 
 
While the enrichment ratio is defined as: 
𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑈
𝑒𝐻𝐸𝑈
  ………………………………………………equation 3.1   
where, 𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑈  = enrichment of LEU 
 𝑒𝐻𝐸𝑈  = enrichment of HEU 
 
 
Aside from finding a LEU replacement with matching operating parameters, information 
obtained from source term provides both the regulators and operators with an estimate of 
postulated radioactivity release and the capability the facility requires for accident mitigation. 
Correspondingly, the knowledge aided the development of scenarios to overcome the extent of 
the challenges identified based on the elements and their corresponding daughter isotopes. In 
addition, it also provided the technical information required for shielding, cask design, storage, 
and eventual transportation of both the unirradiated and irradiated fuel including for emergency 
planning and response. 
It is required that any facility undertaking a facility redesign be subject to conducting and 
evaluating operational accident source term (AST) and the investigation of uncertainties in 
measured and calculated quantities to determine safety margins with associated consequences for 
the management of severe accidents [42]. For the NIRR-1, the result from the AST provides a 
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starting point for the SAR update including the methodologies used in evaluating the technical 
requirements for safety and security. 
The NIRR – 1 fuel is an HEU UA14-A1 enriched at 90% with a burnup estimate of less than 1% 
of fuel after 10 years. To perform a feasibility search for suitable LEU for the conversion of 
NIRR-1, an MCNP model of the current HEU core was developed and benchmarked by 
experimental data [43]. A uranium dioxide (UO2) LEU option with 12.5% enrichment was 
initially identified as a suitable replacement for the HEU core with minor changes to the core 
configuration [44]. However, the manufacturer of the reactor, China Institute of Atomic Energy 
(CIAE), recommended a 13% enriched UO2 fuel rather than the initial 12.5% enrichment 
projected for the conversion of all MNSRs per the collaboration between the RERTR and the 
IAEA’s CRP. Results obtained from the re-evaluation suggested that a UO2 LEU fuel with 341 
pins containing nine Zircalloy claddings can provide about the same cold core excess reactivity 
of 4.91 mk comparable to the present HEU core at 4.97 mk. This contrasts with the 12.5% 
enriched UO2 core requirement of 348 fuel pins and two Zircalloy claddings that was initially 
projected. Aside from that, there is a departure in the value of simulated prompt neutron lifetime 
(lf) quoted by the manufacturer using ‘EXTERMINATORS’ diffusion code to the result obtained 
by Ibikunle et al (2016) when compared to calculated kinematics parameters obtained for the 
present HEU and three other reference LEU alternatives [39] In another related work that was 
motivated by the identified discrepancies in the enrichment proposed by the manufacturer at 13% 
compared to the initial proposal of the SAR, data at 12% enrichment for the LEU replacement, 
Jonah et al found out that two different options each with 12.45% and 12% [45] enrichment will 
suffice for an LEU substitute.  
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As well, Ibikunle et al further investigated the core physics analysis for a suitable LEU 
replacement with three different dispersed LEU fuel (U3Si, U3Si2 and U9Mo) replacements at 
19.75% enrichment highlighted in (Table 3.0) Ibikunle further reported a discrepancy in the 
reactor in simulation and submitted that the power level of any of the three measured LEU fuels 
must be increased from 31kw to 34 kw to obtain an equivalent flux compared to that of the 
present HEU fuel [46].  
 
 
Table 3.1. HEU versus three proposed dispersed LEU fuel parameters 
 Fuel type Enrichment 
% 
Density of 
meat/U 
(g/cc) 
Fuel 
meat 
diameter 
(mm) 
Clad 
material/ 
thickness 
(mm) 
No of 
fuel 
pins 
 HEU - UAl4 90.2 3.456/0.92 4.30 Al/0.60 347 
1 LEU - U3Si 19.75 7.394/5.49 4.30 Al/0.60 347 
2 LEU - U3Si2 19.75 6.409/4.42 4.74 Al/0.38 347 
3 LEU - U9Mo 19.75 8.210/5.95 4.30 Al/0.60 347 
   Source: [46]  
 
 
The evaluation of source term in different research reactors is used in the analysis and behavioral 
understanding of radionuclides’ dispersal pattern at each facility and emergency preparedness 
planning. It can provide information significant to securing such materials and preventing 
unauthorized access to the facility. However, the data collected from each reactor are not 
identical in any two identical reactors operating with the same burnup rates. 
Accordingly, data collected as source term from the analysis of core physics parameters form 
part of a significant requirement for license application and provide information on the changes 
to the facility including design information in fulfillment of the IAEA Comprehensive 
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Safeguards Agreement (CSA). It also provides the baseline information required for the IAEA 
verification. It is used as the activity reference point which assures that a facility is operating 
according to design specification while also assisting the facility’s modelling of radioactive 
dispersal pathways and the volatility of identified nuclides. 
In previous research directed towards establishing core physics parameters of a replacement fuel 
for NIRR-1, Rabba et al [33] estimated the burnup rate using the BUNRER Code VENTURE 
with a UO2 LEU fuel and found out that the LEU substitute fuel has a burnup rate of about 1% 
for 200 days of reactor operation at 9 hours per week. This is an equivalent usage of 0.49 Kg of 
238U. However, only the plutonium isotope (239Pu, 240Pu and 241Pu) generated in the core of 
NIRR-1 were recorded by the code [33]. On the contrary, the need for security and safeguards 
warrants that all radioactive content expected to be released in form of source term from the core 
of the reactor into the pipes, coolant water, and the environment are significantly important. 
Additionally, the work did not establish or evaluate the source strength, or the physical 
characteristics of radioactive materials in terms of half-life and its deposition velocity [47] from 
the generated source term.  
Generally, irradiation and fuel burnup lead to fissile nuclide consumption by fission which 
results in the formation of fission products directly or by radioactive decay. However, some of 
these fission products have their significant merits and demerits in terms of health and safety 
of personnel, the public, and the environment due to the range of their half-lives. In operational 
planning, the protection of health and safety of personnel and of the public from radiological and 
non-radiological hazards associated with radioactivity [48] is important in practices and services 
associated with reactor technology. Hence, the knowledge of their decay period and the ability to 
be able to control the spread of the hazards it may present to personnel, the environment, and to 
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the larger population during accident situations is worth devoting attention to evaluate their 
release using appropriate depletion code.  
The NRC enumerated the expected release fraction using the ORIGEN isotope and depletion 
code for all low burnup and low enrichment as highlighted in (Table 3.2) [42], and the resultant 
IAEA assessment accordingly in (Table 3.3) [49]. In this work, the evaluation was carried out 
using ORIGEN isotope generation and depletion computer code from the most recent update of 
SCALE 6.2.3. to generate the NIRR-1 core inventory and the postulated source term from the 
HEU and LEU core.  
 
 
Table 3.2. Source term grouping and their expected release fractions (US NRC) 
Groups Noble 
Gases 
Halogens Alkali 
Metals 
Tellurium Ba-Sr 
group 
Noble 
metal 
Cerium 
group 
Lanthanide 
Expected 
release 
fraction 
1.0 0.4 0.3 0.05 0.02 0.0025 0.0005 0.0002 
Source: USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.183 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Source term grouping and their expected release fractions (IAEA)) 
Groups Noble Gases (%) Halogens (%) Particulates 
(%) 
Expected release 
fraction 
100 50 1 
      Source: IAEA-TECDOC-643 
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The result from several conversion efforts enumerated below showed diverse challenges 
assumed to have been caused by the transfer of data between codes and the RUN time of the 
codes. 
 
3.1.1 Pakistan Research Reactor-1 
Shoaib et al [50] modelled the atmospheric dispersion and estimated accidental airborne 
radionuclide release from the Pakistan Research Reactor-1 (PARR-1) for the power upgrade of 
the PARR – 1 to a 10 MW based on the US Nuclear Regulatory Authority guide 1.183 to 
determine the atmospheric dispersion and the source term for the fission product inventory in the 
reactor core for the PARR-1, and to plan for evacuation during an emergency [50]. The 
importance of Shoaib’s work was seen in the discovery that the dose rate obtained from his work 
was more than the permissible committed effective dose (CED) at 500 m from the downwind 
distance away from the reactor, according to the scenario result obtained from the released 
fraction calculation for PARR-1. The result further laid credence to the importance of estimating 
facility-specific source term of radioactive accidental release from the core of any reactor during 
operations as a requirement for license renewal for any facility modification.  
 
3.1.2 Syria Research Reactor 
Dawahra et al [51] used the GETERA code to calculate fuel burn up and radionuclide inventory 
for the 30 KW Syria Research reactor (SRR-1) including the output of activities of fission 
products and actinides after 200 days of burn up time. In his result, the atomic density of LEU 
was found to have decreased compared to that of the HEU for the same number of burn up times, 
hence the need for a higher density LEU fuel material. However, the result obtained by Dawahra 
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showed that the conversion of the SRR-1 from HEU to LEU presents some overall advantage in 
terms of cost [51], and further verified the reactors operational safety and site-specific security. 
Accordingly, Dawahra also estimated postulated radiological hazards associated with the 
operation of SRR-1 and the concentrations of fission products and actinide radionuclides in the 
core by investigating the source term due to all operations within the facility. The result obtained 
clearly outlined the importance of source term. Consequently, the outcome of the SRR-1 core 
inventory for both the HEU and the LEU fuel became an important consideration for modelling 
spent fuel management scenarios [52] for safe operations. This inventory is significant because 
the NIRR-1 core will be removed as irradiated spent fuel, thus the need to postulate different 
scenarios of events that may be dangerous to the personnel and the public due to an unexpected 
radionuclide release. 
 
3.1.3 Ghana Research Reactor (GHARR-1) 
The GHARR-1 is a tank in pool reactor that utilizes HEU as fuel. The GHARR-1 has 344 fuel 
elements dispersed in 27.5% aluminum in U-Al matrix with enrichment of 90.2%. The reactor 
was designed with a 10-year HEU core and it was operated at its maximum core flux for 2.5 
hours in a day for 5 days in a week. The GHARR-1 is one of the research reactors recently 
converted from HEU to LEU. Neutronic analysis based on MCNP transport was carried out for 
both the candidate LEU and the operating HEU based on the scheduled core conversion 
program. Equally, a comparative core performance assessment was carried out for both fuels. As 
part of the conversion efforts, Abrefah et al used ORIGEN2 and REBUS3 codes to estimate the 
end-of-cycle isotopic inventory for the design of the spent fuel cask [53] [54] for the 
transportation and HEU core repatriation back to the manufacturers in China. Abrefah asserted 
that the result obtained was consistent with literature for the HEU core when similar calculations 
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were carried out using different methods. The GHARR-1 initial safety analysis report (SAR) also 
projected a UO2 enriched at 12.5% and confirmed by the IAEA’s CRP project on MNSR 
conversion. A further work by Odoi et al also confirmed that the rated power of the LEU core 
must be increase from 31KW to 34KW as well as increase the fuel pins from 344 in HEU to 348 
to retain the core excess reactivity at 4.0mk including the flux at 1.0 x 1012n.cm2.s [54] [55]. 
However, there were slight discrepancies between the manufacturer’s calculated parameters as 
compared to the postulations from other simulated reactor core physics. According to the CIAE, 
the manufacturer of the MNSR prototype, a UO2 LEU core enriched at 13% was simulated to be 
the replacement fuel for the core of the NIRR-1 MNSR reactor. 
Eventually, the GHARR-1 was shut down for core cooling in 2016, and finally, removed and 
repatriated back to China. The present LEU core for GHARR-1 now consists of a zircaloy-4 
alloy of UO2 fuel elements enriched at 13% based on the manufacturer’s recommendation, at a 
total cost of about 20 million USD [54]. The LEU core is expected to operate for about 25 years. 
(Figure 3.1 and 3.2) shows the vertical cross section of GHARR-1 core and the of cask 
containing the GHARR-1 HEU core  
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Figure 3.1. Vertical cross section of GHARR – 1 HEU core 
       Source: Abrefah et al 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Gamma dose rate monitor of cask containing the GHARR-1 HEU core 
            Source: iaea.org 
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3.1.4 The Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) 
The KUCA has a unique feature due to the combination of different core types and neutron 
sources. The KUCA is a multi-core type thermal spectrum critical assembly devoted to 
fundamental research and education on reactor physics. KUCA consists of two solid moderated 
(dry) cores and one light water moderated (wet) core loaded with HEU fuels. In 2012, the DOE 
and the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) conducted joint scientific research for the 
substitution of the HEU fuel to a LEU based fuel, the outcome of which presented some 
drawbacks in core performance safety and validity of academic research results of the LEU fuel 
candidate. U-MO fuel was selected for consideration with varying thicknesses to match up the 
performance of the HEU fuel. But from the result of safety analysis obtained, the scientific 
understanding, including the performance of fuel used in the conversion at the KUCA facility 
was inadequate [56]. The initial studies done on the conversion indicated that a U10Mo with foil 
thickness of 12 mils was inadequate due to the technical challenges of the high accuracy demand 
in fabricating the foil thickness of the replacement LEU fuel which offered a total dependence of 
core reactivity on the fabrication tolerance. This type of technical challenge is not typical and has 
not been witnessed in any previous conversion. As such, an alternative fuel U7Mo with 19.75% 
enrichment in a mixture of aluminum matrix density 6gU/cc was proposed by a joint research 
between the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute (KURRI) in Japan and the Argonne 
National Laboratory (ANL) in the US under the auspices of US DOE Material Management and 
Minimization (M3) program [57]. The collaboration will afford further US-Japan strategic 
promotion of a much-needed opportunity to share technical experience, as was announced jointly 
by both countries during the 2014 nuclear security summit as part of the US-Japan Nuclear 
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Security Working Group (NSWG) [58], to be part of the continuous effort to resolve the 
technical challenges encountered in down-blending the HEU fuel to a lower enrichment.   
 
3.2 Stages and Timeline for HEU to LEU conversion 
According to the National Academy of Science, the conversion of HEU to LEU follows some 
predetermined technical and non-technical steps [59]. The technical steps may be related in all 
facilities in terms of the benchmarking of codes and the involvement of multiple international 
organizations. However, the nontechnical steps may be different for each facility and/or country 
owing to variance in policy and international relations. Because understanding the cultural 
influence on the application of best practices, building of nuclear security culture, cultivating 
safeguards culture, and the implementation process of a nuclear infrastructure is crucial [1] and 
country specific, the implementation structures and stages may not be the same, but the goal 
remains enrichment reduction targeted towards global security.  
The technical steps depicted in (Figure 3.2) and bounded by thick lines consists of stages in the 
conversion program that require or are subject to constraint in fuel performance and the general 
geometry of the new core design while the nontechnical, represented in dotted lines, are stages in 
the conversion program that are related to funding, economics, and general policy within the 
facility or country. 
Although the National Academy of Science steps in (Figure 3.2) take care of the safety 
parameters and most of the technical requirements for the conversion, most of the MNSRs 
considered for conversion are in areas presently known to be volatile and prone to terrorist 
attacks. Then, security becomes an issue of utmost consideration in operation, storage, and 
transport. As well, it is significant to carry out threat assessment and to note the inherent risk at 
enrichment below 20%, including the attractiveness in storage and transport. As such, this 
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research recognizes the importance of security culture in the application and implementation of 
policies that support technical innovations that vary from country to country. Importantly, the 
fuel of NIRR-1 will be shipped back to the country of origin (China), adequate security and 
transport security plans must be recognized for licensing purposes and be put in place. Hence the 
addition of the two more stages to the recommendation of the Material Management and 
Minimization (M3) program colored in green in (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Stages of HEU to LEU conversion including timeline 
Source: Adapted from the National Academies 
 
 
 
  
 36 
 
Chapter 4 
 
THE REACTOR PHYSICS MODELING APPROACH 
 
4.1 Reactor Physics Modelling 
This chapter details the procedures for the simulation of the NIRR-1 core and the general 
modelling of the hypothetical MNSR reactor representation used in this work. It also highlights 
the modeling approach and the methodologies adapted for the analyses of lattice and reactor core 
physics, HEU and LEU fuel assessments, radionuclide nuclide inventories, and the associated 
operational source term. It must be pointed out that for converting or lowering enrichment in any 
reactor, there must be adequate adjustment to the technical specifications of the original core, 
most especially for the excess core reactivity and the shutdown margins, as well as the 
identification any operation constraint [60].   
Though engineering and design drawings were not available at the commencement of this work, 
an existing MCNP input was used as a guide. The choice of  SCALE package was because of its 
capability to generate Keff more precisely and with more accuracy [30] than MCNP, as well as its 
all-inclusive capabilities for depletion and activation, and for the advantage of having an updated 
library that contain up to about 2200 nuclides including about 1470 pre-generated burnup 
libraries. However, starting with a lower version of SCALE, the Graphically Enhanced Editing 
Wizard (GeeWiz) is shown in (Figure 4.1) due to its user friendliness in executing, plotting, and 
viewing results in 3-D [61], the composition and geometry of the reactor were initiated.  
 
 37 
 
 
Figure 4.1. SCALE 6.1 GeeWiz toolbars 
 
 
4.2 Code description 
A wide range of physical parameters were considered to correctly represent reactor physics 
parameters to simulate the characteristics of the HEU, as well as the equivalent parameter of the 
candidate LEU fuel, taking into cognizance safety restrictions that must compensate for the 
penalties of converting from a higher to a lower enrichment. The core of the NIRR-1 reactor is 
comprised of 350 units of lattice rod position out of which 347 contain the fuel elements and 
three dummy rod positions. For the existing HEU, the fuel elements are made up of 90% 
enriched uranium-aluminum alloy, ordered in layers of ten multi-concentric circles at a pitch 
distance of 10.95 mm operating at 31 KW (th). At the same time, the candidate LEU fuel 
projected for the conversion program was designed such that it retained the same size and shape 
of the outbound HEU core. However, the LEU fuel element is made up of 12.5wt % uranium-
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oxide pellets with zircaloy-4 clad with simulated and expected operating power of 34 KW (th). 
Both, the HEU and LEU core simulated design, are located inside an annular beryllium reflector, 
resting over another lower beryllium reflector plate. The fuel pins are held together by a 
combination of two grid plates, guide tube, and four tie rods located in opposite ends of the pin 
bundle [32] 
The code input was initiated, as mentioned above, by entering parameters into the GeeWiz 
platform using the composition window shown in (Figure 4.2). Equally, the geometry for the fuel 
lattice structure of the reactor core was manually generated into the user-friendly windows 
shown in (Figure 4.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. SCALE 6.1 GeeWiz composition window for NIRR-1 model 
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Figure 4.3. Developing the geometry for fuel lattice 
 
 
 
Additionally, the windows interface in GeeWiz allows a step-by-step data input menu in a form 
format that can be viewed in a 3-dimesional output; this is another advantage the GeeWiz hold 
over the more recent SCALE 6.2.3 version. Additional adjustments were made on fulcrum, the 
platform that serves as the graphic user interface (GUI). The KENO3D function helps to 
intermittently visualize complete shape of input geometry [62] as the model progresses in a way 
that ensures that the output is exactly what is being anticipated as shown in (Figure 4.4). One of 
the aims of this research is to be able to use the outcome as a training model to support the 
ongoing efforts of the DOE and the IAEA with subject matter contribution to the enrichment 
reduction program.  
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Figure 4.4. SCALE 3-D model view of NIRR-1 core inside Beryllium reflector 
 
 
The initiated lattice physics model on GeeWiz was opened in fulcrum, a component of SCALE 
6.2 suite available with a graphical user interface (GUI) that provides a modular workspace. 
Fulcrum allows a user to drag and drop generated files for analysis. Despite the user friendliness 
using the window menu format for input in GeeWiz, the SCALE 6.2 version is an improvement 
over the 6.1 version because of the enhanced capability in the analysis of continuous energy (CE) 
Monte Carlo, radiation shielding, depletion, and the fulcrum window, as well as the ENDF/B-
VII.1 nuclear data libraries inclusion of an improved group structure. 
The autocompletion feature in fulcrum helps to determine quick visual input for creating, editing, 
validating, and visualizing inputs. Though this version is a newer model, it only offers a 2-
dimesional view of geometry that includes a user interface that automatically connects with other 
SCALE embedded resource.  
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Presently embedded in all the versions of SCALE suite code are several built-in geometry 
designs for various reactor cores; LWR, BWR, etc., as seen in (Figure 4.5), which can be 
generated automatically as an array when dimensions are specified as input to the code. 
However, going by this, the design pattern of the NIRR1 core must be painstakingly entered 
manually for all the 350 lattice positions. 
The input data as well as the depletion model was set up on fulcrum at intervals of time 
according to the operating history of NIRR-1, with respect to the decaying continuous 
operational power of the reactor using the Transport Rigor Implemented with Time-dependent 
Operation for Neutronic depletion (TRITON). The simulated input was depleted, using the “=t6-
depl” command for the Monte Carlo depletion KENO-VI.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Samples of existing fuel design with SCALE (Array types) 
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4.3 Execution of Code  
4.3.1 General depletion equation 
The ORIGEN uses a type of depletion equation resulting from the solution to the system of 
ordinary differential equation (ODE) in solving for the production and loss rate of nuclides, as 
well as the effective multiplication factor known as Keff. The depletion equation measures the 
rate of change in nuclide concentration. 
 
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑑𝑡
 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑗𝜆𝑗𝑁𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝛷 ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑘𝜎𝑘𝑁𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1  – ( 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛷 𝜎𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 ) 𝑁𝑖 𝐹𝑖    equation 4.0 
 
 
If we consider the equation above as A = B + C – D 
where, 
A represents; Rate of change in Nuclide i 
B represents; Decay into Nuclide i in order j  
C represents; Production of Nuclide i from irradiation and 
D represents; Loss of Nuclide i through decay, irradiation, or other means  
 
Considering the transmutation equation above in matrix form 
Ṅ(𝑡) = AN(𝑡)        equation 4.1 
where,  
Ṅ =     
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝑡
 
 
Nonetheless, the nuclide vector solution can be written in the form; 
N(𝑡) = exp (𝐴𝑡)  N(𝑂)               equation 
4.2  
 where,  
N(𝑂) = Vector of initial atom densities 
A = N x N transition matrix containing rate coefficients for radioactive decay, neutron 
capture and fission 
A matrix of transition elements (S-1) will look like; 
A = - 𝜆 – 𝛷𝜎          equation 4.3  
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The exponential matrix solution above can also be expressed to solve the coupled differential 
equations for the 2600 nuclides in as fast as 0.02 seconds when the initial nuclide concentrations, 
neutron flux (derived from power), nuclear decay data, and neutron cross sections are known. It 
must be recognized that the accuracy of nuclear data determines how best the ORIGEN output 
will become.  
The code was executed on the Nuclear Engineering Cluster, “NeCluster”. The Necluster is a 
combination of 60 computational nodes tightly synchronized and linked together like a single 
computer. The outputs from the RUN are broadly analyzed and discussed in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5 
 
GENERALIZED RISK MODEL, MATERIAL 
ATTRACTIVENESS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 
The elevated concern over the utilization of HEU in research reactors has prompted several 
international initiatives to strengthen nuclear security and nonproliferation. Prominent among the 
strategies adopted is reducing enrichment and stockpiling of weapon-usable materials globally. It 
is assumed that reducing inventory of such materials is a prerequisite to risk reduction, especially 
after the September 2011 terrorist attack in the US. Aside this, there are several indications that 
the level of security at research reactor facilities may not be as robust as that which is obtainable 
at power reactor facilities [63].  
The recognized challenges further raised the probability of preeminent risk in the continuous 
utilization of weapon-usable materials in research reactors. Nonetheless, it is also envisaged that 
lowering the enrichment in such reactors increases the attractiveness in terms insider ability to 
initiate material theft or sabotage. Even though the emission of dangerous gamma rays from 
research reactor spent fuel makes it self-protecting, nuclear material becomes a source for 
proliferation concern as the radioactive fission products in this spent fuel reduces due to its decay 
over a period [63]. Essentially, the longer the decay period, the lesser the risk of acquisition by 
an adversary and the higher the attractiveness and material vulnerabilities that could be attributed 
to such material for malicious or non-peaceful applications.  
In the past, risk communication methodologies heavily relied on categorization of the safe level 
of enrichment in research reactors using individual preferences and personal perception 
representations rather than situational and evidence based. According to the US homeland 
security, the first significant step to understanding risk is to be acquainted to the risk 
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environment, in addition to considering the policy and political climate [64] associated with the 
subject matter to be investigated, including vulnerabilities and the corresponding consequences 
which the occurrence may impose on a facility, country, or the international community [65] 
rather than using a single technical or safety occurrence. Identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities, followed by the analysis of risk to be posed by the identified vulnerabilities and 
their individual contribution to the challenges, is the first step to safeguards and security of 
nuclear materials. Equally, there must be policy guidelines with adequate regulatory framework 
to sustain the application of safeguards and security. 
 
5.1 Risk and material attractiveness in research reactors  
Apparently, the use of both the HEU and LEU in research reactors raises obvious proliferation 
risk of theft and nuclear material misapplication. HEU, on one hand, is a direct weapon-usable 
material while the LEU precipitates higher plutonium yield because of its neutron capture in 
uranium-238 [66] as the operating thermal power of the reactor increases.  
The variation due to enrichment reduction was measured in the Ghana Research Reactor 
(GHARR-1), and it was found that the conversion of HEU to LEU will require increasing the 
fuel pins from 344 to 348 to arrive at the same reactivity as the outgoing HEU. Additionally, the 
reactor nominal power must be increased from 31 kW to 34kW to retain the neutron flux at 1 × 
1012 n.cm2.s inside the irradiation sites [67]. Doing this will compensate for the conversion 
penalties and safety margins required to retain the same operating parameters equivalent to the 
outgoing HEU. 
According to the IAEA, risk of nuclear materials acquisition to manufacture NED, risk of 
acquisition of nuclear materials to produce a radiological dispersal devices (RDD), and total 
facility sabotage are the three main types of risk that must be considered when planning to secure 
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nuclear materials [68]. Besides this, it is important that all security risk analysis and calculation 
be consistent with associated vulnerability, threat assessment, environmental factors, and the 
state regulations. Notably, the combined knowledge of threat motives of non-state actors and the 
increasing threat itself can help provide effective and strategic national and foreign security 
policy [69]. 
Consequently, a wide range of initiating events leading to a step-by-step approach to securing 
nuclear materials at these facilities must be considered from factors that could lead to or 
contribute to nuclear terrorism, material attractiveness, as well as their corresponding figure of 
merit (FOM) and the likelihood of an insider or any non-state actor with global reach acquiring 
nuclear materials from any facility directly or by proxy to make dirty bombs or RDDs. With the 
knowledge of factors known, the development of facility physical security from the evaluation of 
possible pathways for material acquisition must also be considered.  
 
5.2 The Glaser “Risk Metric”  
The Glaser Metric concept was described in chapter one and it postulated that the reduction of 
enrichment from 93% to 45% cuts the attractiveness to about 40%, while the reduction from 93% 
to 20% cuts the attractiveness by about 70%. Glaser evaluated risk to the use of HEU and the 
justification for the conversion of fuel in research and test reactors to LEU based on the 
methodology of strategic value (SV) to quantify material attractiveness and risk value of uranium 
and plutonium in two scenarios. His assumption relied on an adversary having either basic or 
advanced capabilities as enumerated in equation 5.1 and 5.2 with fuel burnup rate at 40% to 
arrive at a risk metric for an MTR type reactor geometry operated at 30MW and varied at 
different enrichments and periods of operation to arrive at the 70% percentage attractiveness 
reduction “making inevitable ad-hoc assumptions” [12]. Acknowledging the model with the 
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assertion of the increase challenges to be faced by adversaries to manufacture weapon-useable 
materials as the enrichment decreases from higher to lower percentages. 
Glaser used equation 5.1 quantitatively to derive the capability of an adversary’s skill to produce 
a gun type weapon with a direct use of uranium recovered from spent fuel using mathematically 
derived equation 5.1 to arrive at SV. Which technically depends on the ability of an adversary’s 
ability to reprocess and recover the much-needed material from a spent fuel.  
 
𝐶𝑀𝐴
∗ = 𝜂1(𝜖𝐹𝐹)
𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝐵(∈𝐹𝐹)
+ 𝜂1(𝜖𝑆𝐹)
𝑚𝑆𝐹
𝑀𝐵(𝜖𝑆𝐹)
        equation 5.1 
where, 
𝐶𝑀𝐴
∗ = Total strategic value of material 
𝑀𝐵 = One bare critical mass of uranium 
𝜂1 = Weighting factor 
𝐹𝐹  and 𝑆𝐹 = mass 
𝜖 = Enrichment level 
 
While in equation 5.2 quantitatively measured the scenario where the extent of an adversary 
capability can manufacture an implosion type weapon from the combined worth of uranium and 
plutonium of critical mass 4 kg in equation 5.2 
 
𝐶𝑀𝐵1
∗ = 𝜂2(𝜖𝐹𝐹)
𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑅(𝜖𝐹𝐹)
+ 𝜂2(𝜖𝑆𝐹)
𝑚𝑆𝐹
𝑀𝑅(𝜖𝑆𝐹)
+
𝑚𝑝𝑢
4.0𝑘𝑔
       equation 5.2 
 
Glaser performed his calculation using MCNP and his work relied on a result from a single 
rod/unit cell calculation rather than the whole core of the reactor MTR. His work emphasized 
proliferation concern and attributes measured based on (i) intermittent refueling of research 
reactors over the life time of the facility, (ii) fresh fuel shipment and (iii) the storage of same 
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within the facility. However, combined attributes for the global enrichment reduction conversion 
of reactors utilizing HEU to LEU was based on the concern for security, vulnerability of 
materials, perceived misuse and the acquisition of the materials by terrorist group. If all these 
factors were realistically considered, material attractiveness and risk evaluation must therefore 
consider all environmental factors, vulnerability assessments, adversary type and capabilities 
peculiar to each of the facilities since they are operated under different conditions but the same 
and domesticated international standards. 
Based on this study, it is worthy to note that most MNSR facilities, no refueling or fuel storage is 
particularly necessary because the reactor is built to operate for about ten (10) years made 
possible with the addition of beryllium plates as the fuel is consumed. 
Again, the Glaser risk metrics identified strategic value for material attractiveness at different 
level of enrichment above and below 20% including the results obtainable from the two 
scenarios in equation 5.1 and 5.2. Nonetheless, assuming reducing enrichment from 93% to 20% 
reduces attractiveness by 70%. Even so, there is no perfect system, the state and the rest of the 
international community retains the liability of the remaining 30% attractiveness to nuclear 
materials. Hence, 30% risk is not best practice and cannot translate to an acceptable risk for 
licensing and regulatory requirements in safety, security and safeguards. 
The theft of irradiated materials from the NIRR-1 facility may not be viable because of the self-
protecting nature of irradiated materials from the reactor which is ascribed as a form of physical 
protection at nuclear facilities. However, terrorist groups may be willing to sacrifice self against 
the recommended limit of 1 Sv/hr standard of unshielded material at 1 meter [70] to obtain or 
expose irradiated material to the facility and cause environmental hazard. The core of NIRR-1 is 
designed and subject to removal and shipment to the manufacturer at the end of its useful core 
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life which should have eliminated the perpetual storage of fresh fuel, on the contrary, 3 pins of 
fresh unirradiated HEU fuel is kept within the facility storage room. Intrinsically, our risk 
emphasis is placed on the risk of invasion or disruption by insider or any of the nonstate actors as 
well as the theft of one or more of the unirradiated fuel in storage.  
Globally, non-state actors are recognized as an out-of-bound to all known security and the 
nonproliferation strategies, and according to the International Security Index (iSi), it is expected 
that the strength and the scale of their activities including the threat of nuclear war between 
countries [71] will generally be on the increase. In the light of these threats, securing nuclear 
materials becomes very imperative that the methodologies for estimating risk and materials 
attractiveness should neither be limited to technical inferences of enrichment reduction in the use 
of nuclear materials or a parallel assertion that does not consider the threats, vulnerability(s) and 
challenges peculiar to each country and facility as suggested by the Glaser risk metric.  
Again, this rise will eventually at some point increase the attractiveness of nuclear materials 
above the 30% denoted by the Glaser estimates. As well, methodologies for risk allocation must 
consider the vulnerability, intensity, scale and consequences arising from acts of sabotage or 
terrorism. 
The risk model in this research was carried out and compared with one of the prominent risk 
models used by the proponents of enrichment reduction in test and research reactors developed 
by Glaser. In addition, the evaluation of risk and material attractiveness in this work considered 
that any quantity or enrichment can be used for RDD. Therefore, information based on the type 
of element, isotope, quantity and irradiation were considered to plan for mitigation of any fallout 
from possible acquisition or attack at an imaginary facility designed in this research. Also, the 
type (i.e, plutonium, or uranium) including their fissile content, chemical and physical form, 
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extent of dilution, level of material irradiation and quantity [68] as described in Appendix 2 
(table of nuclear materials at different categories) were used as guide for the analysis carried out 
on the imaginary facility that represented the NIRR-1 facility.  
 
5.3 Core physics parameters for risk evaluation 
It should be pointed out that this research partially agreed with the Glaser Metric, the risk model 
for this work aggregated the physics parameters in terms of the core source terms, plutonium 
balance and burnup with their associated vulnerabilities to demonstrate how well the risk 
evaluation is important to security and safeguards as well as the assurance that the tampering or 
outright forceful removal of one or more of 345 fuel pins can be detected at all levels of 
enrichment as well as the level of physical security to protect the HEU replacement fuel in 
storage.  
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), risk is “the potential for an 
unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event as determined by its likelihood and the 
associated consequences” [72]. Based on this definition, the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a 
nuclear facility has been postulated by many research [73] [74] [75]. 
 
5.4 Coefficient for calculating realistic risk and risk reduction for the NIRR-1 
MNSR  
A well-designed facility Physical protection System (PPS) must always be tested and reviewed 
and should be accurate initialize the response in action to interrupt any adversary action before 
the adversary task time. Using the security risk assessment process in (Figure 5.1) was used to 
evaluate the material attractiveness and the vulnerabilities of a hypothetical NIRR-1 facility. 
Measures of religious ideology, poverty and corruption were also considered for the Nigerian 
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situation as a measure of the risk assessment in this work. The physical protection system of this 
hypothetical facility will be evaluated by an adversary sequence diagram (ASD) that will be 
discussed later in this chapter. The global enrichment reduction program must conceptualize the 
cost benefit analysis in the in terms of increasing the physical security of some of the facilities 
where the threat and target of the adversary may not be theft but disruption. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Security Risk Assessment Process 
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5.4.1 Material attractiveness by means of figure of merit (FOM) 
Material attractiveness is the methodology used for the assessment of physical protection and 
international safeguards. It calculates the attractiveness and evaluates the usability of plutonium 
producing materials from fuel cycle [76] as well the amount or extent of material attractiveness 
that could advertently be required by a proliferant state or a non-state actor for non-peaceful 
purposes of weapon manufacture or production of RDDs. Material attractiveness is a guaranteed 
way to evaluate the risk posed range of nuclear materials; special nuclear materials (SNM), 
alternate nuclear material (ANM) and actinides with critical mass of fission products because it 
uses unique physical properties of such materials for assessment in a way that they are traceable 
and can be reproduced [77].  
The extent of attractiveness derived as FOM defines the limits of usability of such materials 
while access and the sophistication of adversary determines the type of material sorted after. The 
value of usability of nuclear material can be derived from equation 5.3 when all conditions are 
met. 
 
𝐹𝑂𝑀1 = 1 −  𝑙𝑜𝑔10    
𝑀
800
+
𝑀ℎ
4500
+
𝑀
50
(
𝐷
500
)
1
𝑙𝑜𝑔10 2       equation 5.3 
         
where, 
M = bare critical mass of the metal (kg) 
h = heat content (W/kg) 
N = mass of a fuel assembly, fuel rods, or other sources of nuclear material (kg) 
D = dose rate (of 0.2M or of N) evaluated at 1 meter from the surface (rad/h) 
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Equally, the result following equation 5.3 is used to categorize attractiveness for materials in 
form of alloys and metals as enumerated in (Table 5.1). Correspondingly, materials with FOM 
between one (1) and two (2) are said to be attractive, though it is more preferred when greater 
than two (2). But when the number reduces from one (1) to less than one (1), the materials 
becomes less attractive and non-weapon-usable. Nevertheless, such materials could 
advertently be used as RDDs when it is acquired by an adversary or any of the nonstate actors.  
 
 
Table 5.1. Categorization of material attractiveness for alloys and metals based on FOM 
FOM Weapons Utility Attractiveness 
 >2 
 1 to 2 
 Preferred 
 Attractive 
 High 
 Medium 
 0 to 1 
 <0 
 Unattractive 
 Unattractive 
 Low 
 Very Low 
                       Source: [77] 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Assessment of NIRR-1 facility location and vulnerabilities 
Few non-state actors have been identified as having the capability to acquire weapon-usable 
materials to manufacture weapon of mass destruction, though in concept, it is difficult to assert 
the degree of their capabilities. It has further been suggested that the likelihood of a crude and 
low-level attack technique may be employed in trying to obtain these materials with an attendant 
disruptive rather than destructive [78] consequence. 
It should also be pointed out that the NIRR -1 facility is in the volatile North-Eastern part of 
Nigeria, where the Boko Haram terrorist group (now Islamic State of West Africa, ISWA) 
operates. It is well known that this group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State terrorist group 
(ISIS) and have increased their attacks on soft and vulnerable targets [79]. The Islamic State 
(ISIS) is one of the known terrorist organization seeking to obtain nuclear materials from Russia 
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in exchange for access to oil fields captured in the Anbar province of Iraq [80]. In 2015, it was 
speculated from a recovered video evidence that the ISIS group was plotting to acquire nuclear 
materials by kidnaping a senior researcher from the BR-2 reactor at the Belgian Nuclear 
Research Centre or his family member as ransom to have access to the material [81]. Based on 
the nearness of the Nigerian research reactor facility, it is believed that the conversion of HEU to 
LEU core will be a good value added to the global risk and proliferation reduction. Besides Boko 
Haram’s connection and declaration for ISIS, there are confirmed reports of a connection, offer 
of assistance and training support for Boko Haram by one faction of the al-Qaida terrorist group, 
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) [82] 
Other prominent non-state actors in this category interested in accessing nuclear materials to 
manufacture weapon of mass destruction are the Al Qaeda, Chechnya-based separatists, Lashkar-
e-Taiba, and Aum Shinrikyo [83]. Nonetheless, the Aum Shinrikyo based in Japan have more 
than the other groups displayed intents and their capabilities for complex engineering efforts 
including overwhelming penchant to facilitate and deploy chemical weapons [84]. The NIRR-1 
facility’s vulnerability is not limited to terrorist attach scenario alone, the dwindling economic 
situation in Nigeria makes the facility and personnel vulnerable to elicitation from outsiders. 
Recalling that in 1992, 1.5 kg of HEU was stolen from a scientific facility by personnel at the 
Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, due to worsening economic situation. 
Similarly, a plot by some personnel of the Chelyabinsk region’s nuclear facilities was thwarted 
by the Russian Federal Security Service [85]. 
The NIRR-1 facility is rated according to the IAEA INFCIRC 225, Rev 5 as a category III [68] 
facility represented in (Table 5.2) this is based on the acknowledgement of the facility not having 
significant off-site risk but with the potential for accidents resulting in deterministic health 
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effects on-site. Equally, (Table 5.3) enumerated level of materials, diversion that will be enough 
to develop NED as well as the IAEA categorization of nuclear materials based on INFCIRC 225, 
Rev 5 [86]. Based on these tables, no amount of materials acquired under Category III is enough 
to construct a nuclear explosive device. However, the risk inherent for Category III materials are 
that of theft for the purpose manufacture of RDD or the environmental consequence of attack on 
the facility that may inadvertently lead to death, injury and prolonged economic problem.  
 
 
 
Table 5.2. Nuclear material categorization 
Material Enrichment Category I Category II Category III 
1.Plutonium Any ≥2 kg ≥500 g and <2 kg  
2.Uranium- 
235 (235U) 
≥20% 235U ≥5 kg ≥1 kg and < 5 kg 
 
≥15 g and < 1 kg 
≥10% and <20% 
235U 
 ≥10 kg 
 
≥1 kg and < 10 kg 
≥0.71% and <10% 
235U 
  ≥10 kg 
3.Uranium- 
233 (233U) 
Any  
 
≥2 kg ≥500 g and < 2 kg 
 
≥15 g and < 500 g 
Source: [86] 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3. Material requirements versus security categories 
Security Category Thefts/Diversion 
Category I Single theft/diversion of nuclear materials enough 
to build NED 
Category II At least two thefts/diversions of nuclear materials 
required to build NED 
Category III Many thefts/diversions of nuclear materials 
required to build NED 
Less than Category III Thefts/diversions of nuclear materials is 
insignificantly suitable to build NED 
Source: [86] 
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5.4.3 Religious Ideology, Poverty and corruption as a measure of security risk 
Regrettably, personnel working in the over 40 of the HEU operated research reactors may be 
susceptible to crime, corruption, financial inducement or blackmail in exchange for information 
and nuclear material or both. Most are especially in developing countries and areas where there 
is ongoing crisis. The NIRR-1 facility in Nigeria is government owned and operated and could 
be vulnerable to these challenges. According to a United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 
(UNODC) report on a nationwide household survey on corruption across all the states in Nigeria 
conducted in 2017, it was reported that 32.3% of the sample population in Nigeria paid or 
requested to pay bribes when in contact with public officials in Nigeria. It was further established 
in the same survey that corrupt practices are more prevalent with younger demography while an 
estimated 400 Billion NGN ($1.11 Billion) is paid yearly in cash bribes in Nigeria [87]. 
Essentially, the NIRR-1 facility is based in the Northern Nigeria with locally recruited personnel 
with different level of education, income and the challenges that come with economic situation 
in Nigeria.  
With the account that Boko Haram fraternizes with other deadly terrorist groups, it is obligatory 
that Nigeria and all IAEA Member States put in place good policy and adequate technical 
safeguards and security protocols that is enough to meet the status of their nuclear program to 
protect nuclear materials from misuse and clandestine activities [88]. A basic challenge that 
could hamper governments initiative is the decline in public trust for government agenda and 
policy.  
There will be no international terror organization without the involvement of locals. The measure 
of success in our counterterrorism activities should go beyond the understanding, planning to foil 
attacks, arresting and prosecuting terrorist to examining the conditions under which and why 
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each of the groups thrive in recruiting members. In a joint research by the US and some Yemeni 
experts, it was discovered that poverty, low quality life and education are major drivers of locals 
joining or collaborating with terrorist organizations. Even though there are little empirical 
evidence to draw conclusion that poverty drives terrorism in some of these states where 
increasing number of such activities have been recorded, because of reported cases among 
wealthy communities [89]. Indications are that the attacks in poorest areas are becoming deadlier 
as shown in (Figure 5.2), the attack heat map generated by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism [90]. In Nigeria, the inhabitants of the Northeastern part 
where the deadly Boko Haram extremist groups operates are among the poorest. A 2012 
statistics on poverty profile in Nigeria showed that out of the estimated 163 million country 
population, 112.47 million representing 69% of the population are poor with the Northeast share 
of about 69% of the total estimated poor [91]. Based on the heat map of attacks, the cost 
conversion allocated to the conversion program must equally consider the physical facility 
upgrade of the facility. 
Nonetheless, to complete the evaluation of security risk and the requisite vulnerability 
assessment of the NIRR-1 facility based on location, past incidences ascribed to restive and 
terrorist groups, this research assumed that enrichment reduction may sound as reduced risk from 
perspective of a nonprofessional or a non-scientist. To develop security policy, a better 
understanding of each groups’ determination and capabilities in carrying out attacks as well as 
projected targets [92]. The data on (Table 5.4) was developed based on assumption using 
statistics from literature and information from well-established sources [90] on a format adapted 
from “Security IndexTM, Capabilities Rating” 
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Figure 5.2. Heat map of global terrorist attacks 
   Source: [90] 
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Table 5.4. Threat capability and evaluation of non-state actors in Nigeria and affiliates 
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Boko Haram 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 
Islamic Movement in Nigeria (INM) 2 4 4 2 2 4 3 3 2 3 
Kala Kato 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Izala Movement 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
The Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS) 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 
Al Qaeda 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 4 3 4 
Chechnya-based separatists 4 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
Lashkar-e-Taiba 4 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 
Aum Shinrikyo 5 3 3 5 3 4 5 4 5 4 
“Fulani Cattle rearers” (Herdsmen) 3 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 1 4 
(1 – Non-Existent / Not Known, 2 – Immature / Non-Effective, 3 – Workable / Effective, 4 – 
Good, 5 – Excellent) 
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5.5 Potential proliferation risk, and theft pathways in enrichment reduction 
Most of the recent efforts in in counterterrorism and protection of nuclear materials considers the 
interest and the ability of terrorist group to manufacture nuclear weapon from acquired SQ of 
nuclear material. But the present work takes the initiative to evaluate and evaluate risk using the 
NIRR-1 facility based on the outcome of a neutronic model developed from the operating 
parameters and history of the facility. The amount of fission products that can be released if the 
facility is attacked is the major interest because the amount of plutonium that can be produced 
throughout the life time of operation of the core cannot produce the quantity required to 
manufacture any weapon.  
The assessment of capabilities of the non-state actors within the Nigeria territory, countries 
having established boarders with Nigeria and most especially those that have their operating base 
near the NIRR-1 facility are equally assessed.  
Risk evaluation, communication and assessment cannot be completed without the assessment of 
critical factors for protection system. Physical protection system as well must consider the role 
an insider could playacting alone or in collaboration with a potential adversary. 
 
5.5.1 Insider threat and mitigation 
Trusted personnel remain the most dangerous and the greatest risk to any organization because of 
their knowledge and privileged access to equipment, document and the facility in general. They 
may use their position to carry out espionage, theft of intellectual property and sabotage [93] 
[94]. Because of peculiarity of the NIRR-1 facility in terms of location, there must be adequate 
culture of security and safeguards to prevent elicitation outside influence on the facility 
personnel 
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Undesirable consequences can result from the theft of a nuclear material from any facility that 
can have grave psychological impact, economic loss, environmental damage, and loss of critical 
infrastructure as well as loss of life may be in the process of responding and neutralizing the 
adversary there may be shot outs that could result to loss of life and secondly, if the response was 
not able to neutralize the adversary, they may intentionally use the stolen material as a weapon to 
produce; RDD or Radiological Emitting Device (RED) that could be used to cause maximum 
harm to the people and environment. It must be noted that the conversion program only reduces 
the enrichment in fuel but does not mitigate unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or 
unauthorized transfer of radioactive sources. There the establishment of facility protection must 
come alongside the program to prevent the threat of unauthorized access by both insider and 
outsiders. A graded approach to prevent and protect against the insider was developed by the 
IAEA as shown in (Figure 5.3).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The IAEA graded approach for preventing and protecting against insiders 
         Source: [94] 
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5.6 Adversary Sequence Diagram 
The security risk assessment and evaluation techniques for the hypothetical facility design in 
(Figure 5.4) was carried out using with the concept of adversary path to model the PPS, the 
assessment considered the fact that adversary from outside will transverse several layers of 
security.  
The design breakdown echoed on timely identification of clandestine activities and the needed 
detection as well as delay elements up to the time when the guards must respond to interrupt as 
well as call for external backup if there is need for intervention before the adversary gets to the 
target. In addition, early detection elements were considered near the perimeter fence while 
equally adding delay elements near the target. (Figure 5.5) represents the timeline for an 
adversary to complete task (Tc) as well as the timeline for the facility protection system to be 
activated against the adversary (TI). In this design, detection and response time is expected to be 
less than time it will take the adversary to complete any task through the Most Vulnerable Path 
(MVP). Beside this the PPS system must be such that can delay adversary timeline as soon as the 
first alarm (To) is heard and assessed (TA). All actions and consequences are ranked and 
represented as the risk equation [95]. The ranking system is accomplished by accumulating the 
probabilities of all timely detection elements along a path and referred to as the probability of 
interruption (PI). Consequently, all detection must occur before the Critical Detection Point 
(CDP), which is the point where the last timely detection element is located before an adversary 
completes action. Respectively, each of the elements is associated with a probability of detection 
as well as a non-detection probability represented by equation 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4. Hypothetical reactor layout design 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Adversary Task completion timeline 
       Source: [95] 
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𝛽𝐷
𝑗 = 1 − 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
     equation 5.4 
 
where, 
𝛽𝐷
𝑗  = Non-detection probability of each detection element 
Equally, there is the probability that an adversary will not be detected all the numerus 
independent elements before the timeline, Tc either by a system breakdown or evasion. The 
probabilities or product of this non-detection for those elements  
𝛽𝐷 = ∏ 𝛽𝐷
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1      equation 5.6  
 
 
For a well-designed PPS, the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼) is represented by: 
 
𝑃𝐼 = 1 - 𝛽𝐷     equation 5.7  
 
 
 
From equation 5.7, the risk to the facility can be derived from applying equation 5.8 when  
 
 
𝑅 =  𝑃𝐴  (1 −  𝑃𝐼  𝑃𝑁  )𝐶    equation 5.8  
 
 
where 
–  PA is the probability that an adversary will attack a facility along a path, 
–  PI is the probability of interruption of the adversary along that path, 
–  PN is the probability of neutralization given that we have interrupted the 
adversary in a timely manner, and 
–  C is the consequence of adversary success 
Adequate level of security systems must be placed on all critical infrastructure using a 
multilayered combination of human and material resources [96] to protect assets. Such design 
may employ the use of modeling and simulation tools in a way that brings together various 
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elements of security system to achieve desired result [97]. Several organizations including the 
US DOE has employed the use of simulation tools like the Estimate of Adversary Sequence 
Interruption (EASI) and other software to develop as well as evaluate attack scenarios as a means 
of assessment of facility PPS [98] 
According to the IAEA [99], physical protection system must be designed to protect all nuclear 
facilities, radioactive materials, and services as well as any critical infrastructures from 
consequences of unwarranted acts of sabotage. But the design must consider very clearly and 
succinctly the understanding of all threat, vulnerabilities, likely adversary both within (insider) or 
from outside of the facility. As well, the design must convey the ability to detect, delay and 
response including the requisite emergency plans to mitigate the challenges that may arise from 
such malicious actions.  
This research exploited the quantitative method of analyzing the combination of probability of 
delay, detection and response designed with 95% statistical degree of confidence to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the PPS for the hypothetical facility in (Figure 5.4) using the EASI software was 
designed by the Sandia National Laboratory to evaluate PPS design by proving scenarios of path 
and conditions of vulnerability as well as threat within a facility [95]. In view of the heat map of 
terrorist attacks shown in (Figure 5.2) as well as the threat and capability table of non-state actors 
in (Table 5.4), a sequence of nine adversary layered event was developed using the hypothetical 
facility in (Figure 5.4) as shown in (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6. Sequence and adversary path layer of event for hypothetical facility 
 
 
 
Cut wire fence 
Run to Vital Area 
Open outer Door 
Penetrate protected area 
Run to protected area 
Open inner door 
Penetrate Reactor room 
Run towards target 
Sabotage target 
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The evaluation of the facility PPS sequence of nine adversary layered event was carried out in 
two scenarios; (i) an adversary working without any assistance from an insider and (ii) an 
adversary assisted by an insider. The model was designed to achieve a 95% statistical degree of 
confidence of effectiveness of guard’s communication after the first alarm is received, equally 
the response force time (RFT) was set at 270 seconds limit to intercept adversary actions. In 
addition, the EASI design uses an estimated ± 30% standard deviation for each mean value.  
(Figure 5.7) describes the scenario without any insider collusion and from the result obtained 
using the EASI model, the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼) obtained was 0.9472. From the design, 
the total response force time used in the design was 270 seconds, while the adversary total time 
was 586 seconds. Based on this PPS, the adversary will be interrupted and neutralized on the 7th 
path which is the critical detection point (CDP), this is referred to as the point within the system 
design along the adversary path where the projected delay exceeds the response force time. From 
this PPS, the time remaining after interruption is the difference between the adversary task time 
ATT (586) and the response force time (270) is 316 seconds. 
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Figure 5.7. Facility EASI estimate of Probability of Interruption without insider collusion 
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Consequently, (Figure 5.8) was developed to describe another scenario with insider collusion, it 
was assumed that the insider collusion adversely affected the effectiveness of the security 
detection system within the facility. As seen from (Figure 5.8), most delay elements were greatly 
reduced due to the insider assistance, which gave the adversary an advantage of shorter time to 
beat the delay systems in place as well as lesser time to reach the target. The adversary total time 
for Table 5.5 was 269 seconds while the response force time was 270 seconds. Accordingly, 
since the adversary task time is lesser than the response force time, the probability of interruption 
(𝑃𝐼) obtained from the EASI model was 0.3812 which is an indication of an ineffective PPS, 
hence the response force will not be able to neutralize the adversary. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Facility EASI estimate of Probability of Interruption with insider collusion 
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Chapter 6 
 
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS AND HOW IT AFFECTS 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM PLANNING, APPROACH, AND 
OPERATION 
 
The ORIGEN suit of SCALE code was used to generate a wide-ranging radionuclide 
composition for the plutonium and uranium isotopic composition as well as their corresponding 
radioactivity. Inventories for three material groups; fission products, actinides including their 
daughter isotopes. The mass in gram and activities in curies were tracked and documented. From 
the result as well, a 3-D image for the core of the reactor was generated.  
As a first step in this study, SCALE code was developed from an existing MCNP input for the 
study and evaluation of the HEU core performance as well as the corresponding LEU 
replacement fuel. The plutonium balance in both the HEU and LEU simulated core were 
analyzed to predict the extent of weapon-usable materials that will be left in the spent fuel after 
some predetermined Effective Full Power Day (EFPD). The rated power obtained from the 
safety analysis report (SAR) were used in the simulation for both the HEU and the LEU core 30 
KW and 34 KW respectfully. Equally obtained from the SAR was the choice of UO2 Zircaloy 
fuel replacement at 12.5% enrichment. However, the input to the SCALE has a flexibility of 
modification depending on the enrichment level of choice for further simulation. From the result 
obtained from the simulation which is further discussed later in this chapter, the quantity of 
plutonium produced at lower enrichment in the global evaluation of the non-proliferation in 
research and test reactors should be revisited if the for all purpose and intent, the conversion 
program is set to achieve the objectives set forward. 
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A characteristic assessment to evaluate the technical and safety risk was developed using 
neutronic model derived from the unit cell/rod design shown in (Figure 6.1 and 6.2). The reactor 
burnup was carried out the TRITON depletion model to determine and estimate the fission 
products and the actinides, above all the materials classified as special nuclear materials (SNM) 
that are important to production of weapon-usable material of any type and form 
The results obtained for seven days TRITON RUN from a unit rod showed that the quantity of 
plutonium was more at higher nominal power. From the result, it can be observed that; for all 
intent and purpose, risk evaluation restricted to reduced enrichment in all test and research 
reactor is not complete not minding the additional vulnerabilities assessment in the type, location 
and size of facility as well as capabilities of terrorist groups operating near the facility or state 
that may be seeking nuclear materials. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Top view of material arrangements in NIRR-1-unit cell 
Fuel Material 
Clad thickness 
2.75 mm 
Mater
ial Fuel diameter 
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Figure 6.2. Lateral view of simulated NIRR-1unit rod design 
 
 
Equally, the 3-D model of the NIRR-1 developed with the GeeWiz is shown in (Figure 6.3) 
while (Figure 6.4) is the 3-D model of the core surrounded by the beryllium reflector as well as 
the upper beryllium shim plate and the lower or bottom beryllium reflector slab. 
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Figure 6.3. 3-D model of NIRR core with SCALE/GeeWiz 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. 3-D model of NIRR-1 with SCALE/GeeWiz 
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6.1.1 NIRR-1 burnup and activity related to risk 
The initial result from the unit rod burnup was used to investigate the amount and specific 
activity of selected nuclides of uranium and plutonium isotopes at the end of variable 
predetermined years of burnup. According to Mark et al [100], critical mass of any reactor grade 
plutonium metal after discharge is more reactive than any weapon grade uranium. For every 
weapon grade material, it is expected that a certain amount of isotope composition of plutonium 
is present as highlighted in (Table 6.1)  [100]. Subsequently, for safeguards, it is expected that 
any measured level above the facility or levels should draw the attention of the state regulators or 
the IAEA.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Estimated plutonium isotopic composition in weapon grade materials 
 Isotope 
Grade 238Pu 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu 
Super-grade  0.98 0.02 - - 
Weapon-grade 0.00012 0.938 0.058 0.0035 0.00022 
Reactor-grade 0.013 0.603 0.243 0.091 0.050 
MOX-grade 0.019 0.404 0.321 0.178 0.078 
FBR blanket - 0.96 0.04 - - 
Source: [100] 
 
The manufacture of a nuclear weapon may be quite expensive [101], production of nuclear 
explosives takes about 35 pounds of 235U or 9 pounds of 239Pu [102]. It takes more effort to 
produce, but not as much to invade by terrorist or disperse radioactive materials. Besides, 239Pu is 
widely considered by the public to be the worst of all transmutation products with half-life of up 
to 24,100 years. The element emits an alpha radiation which is very highly ionizing. It is 
produced in nuclear reactor by neutron capture of 238U [100] continuously irrespective of the 
level of enrichment.  
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Risk from the radiotoxic elements were quantified by simulating the quantities in grams and 
curies of the nuclides of uranium and plutonium isotopes from the decay and production of 
nuclides for seven days to identify the most weapon-usable materials that can be produced per 
operational time of the NIRR-1 research reactor. As part of the IAEA requirements for peaceful 
application of nuclear technologies, it is required that states prevent the malicious use of nuclear 
materials under the “prudent management practices” as well as encourages the classification of 
materials with respect to element, isotope, quantity and irradiation [68].  
This will be a valuable information required by the IAEA as part of declaration and safeguards 
verification. In addition, it will be valuable for evaluation of risk considering all identified 
vulnerabilities, security and safeguards. As well, (Figure 6.5 and 6.8) results were obtained for 
quantity in grams (g) as well as the specific activity in curies (ci) respectfully, the activity 
obtained in (Figure 6.8) is important for planning emergency and the inherent in the accidental or 
deliberate dispersal of such material.  
The nuclide concentration of both the HEU and the LEU were simulated for a week worth 
operation of approximately 2.5 hours of operation per day. The average burnup from the 
simulated result was 0.021 GW/MTIHM for the HEU while that obtained for LEU was 0.014.  
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Figure 6.5. List of selected nuclides volumetric concentration (g) (unit rod HEU) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Fission products after seven day (g) (unit rod HEU) 
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Figure 6.7. Actinides elements after seven day (g) (unit rod HEU) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8. List of selected nuclides concentration (Ci) (unit rod HEU) 
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Figure 6.9. Seven days operational decay (unit rod, HEU) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10. List of selected nuclides volumetric concentration (g) (unit rod LEU) 
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Figure 6.11. Fission products after seven day (g) (unit rod LEU) 
 
 
Figure 6.12.  Actinides elements after seven day (g) (unit rod LEU) 
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Figure 6.13. Seven days operational radioactive nuclide activity decay (unit rod, LEU) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14. List of selected nuclides concentration (Ci) (unit rod LEU) 
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The production of isotopes of plutonium in large quantity will be the most significant attributes 
of any proliferating state. In the simulated output, the quantity of 239Pu balance after 7 days of 
operation was recorded in both HEU and LEU output. (Figure 6.15) shows the quantity of 239Pu 
in both HEU and the LEU fuels simulated. Evidently, from the values obtained from the plot, 
239Pu balance for LEU fuel was 1.49g while HEU was 0.118g.  
 
 
Figure 6.15. Plutonium (239Pu) balance after 7 days burn up HEU versus LEU 
 
 
 
Equally, the isotopic quantity of selected uranium and plutonium isotopes for both HEU and the 
LEU were simulated for 1-year worth operation of approximately 2.5 hours of operation per day 
for 5 days a week for the three-material groups; fission, actinides and the light elements are 
highlighted in (Figure 6.22). 
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Figure 6.16.  Fission products after 1-year operating time for unit rod (HEU) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17. Actinides after 1-year operating time for unit rod (HEU) 
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Figure 6.18. 1- year operational radioactive nuclide activity decay (unit rod, HEU) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19. Fission products after 1-year operating time for unit rod (LEU) 
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Figure 6.20. Actinides after 1-year operating time for unit rod (LEU) 
 
 
Figure 6.21. 1-year operational radioactive nuclide activity (Unit rod, LEU) 
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Furthermore, the characteristic assessment was carried out using same neutronic model derived 
from the unit cell/rod design shown in (Figure 6.1 and 6.2) to determine and estimate of the 
materials classified as special nuclear materials (SNM) that are important to production of 
weapon-usable material or dispersal agent. The result obtained as well showed that the quantity 
of plutonium was more when the LEU was simulated, apparently as mentioned in chapter 1 that 
the increase in 238U isotopic content in HEU from 9.0 wt% to 87.05 wt% in LEU will produce 
more weapon-usable 239Pu in spent fuel of the LEU, equally from the values obtained from the 
plot, 239Pu balance for LEU fuel was 95.089g while HEU was 7.652g shown in (Figure 6.22). 
Consequently, the fact that this noticeable increase will give rise to weapon-usable 239Pu in spent 
fuel of the LEU should be a big source of concern for the enrichment reduction program as well 
as international safeguards and accounting for nuclear materials. Based on the quantity of 
weapon-usable 239Pu obtained from both simulations, it is suggested that risk evaluation 
restricted to reduced enrichment in all test and research reactor is not complete, not minding the 
additional vulnerabilities assessment in the type, location and size of facility as well as 
capabilities of terrorist groups operating near the facility or state that may be seeking nuclear 
materials. 
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Figure 6.22. Plutonium (239Pu) balance after 7 days burn up HEU versus LEU 
 
 
 
Table 6.2. Plutonium isotopes with their properties including Americium-241 
Isotopes Half-life 
(years) 
Bare critical mass 
(Kg, 𝛼- phase) 
Spontaneous fission 
neutrons (gm-s)-1 
Decay heat 
(watts Kg-1) 
238Pu 87.7 10 2.6 x 103 560 
239Pu 24,100 10 22 x 10-3 1.9 
240Pu 6,560 40 0.91 x 103 6.8 
241Pu 14.4 10 49 x 10-3 4.2 
242Pu 376,000 100 1.7 x 103 0.1 
241Am 430 100 1.2 114 
Source: [100] 
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6.1.2 Safeguards of nuclear material in Nigeria 
The NIRR-1 facility is regulated by the Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) 
established by an Act of parliament (Act 19 of 1995) to ensure the protection of life, health, 
property and the environment as well as ensuring that Nigeria’s national and international 
security, safety and safeguards obligations are met. The NNRA is also charged with the powers 
to categorize and license facilities and services involving ionizing radiation. Under the IAEA 
safeguards, Nigeria has ratified and domesticated most of the existing Legally Binding 
International Instruments as well as Legally Non-binding International Instruments such as the; 
the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) as well as the Amendment 
to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; and International Convention for 
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) as 
well as the Protocol Additional to the CSA, UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, the 
Pelindaba Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free zone, the IAEA Code of Conduct on the 
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance to the Code on 
Import and Export of Radioactive Material. 
Accordingly, the objectives of safeguards application to the NIRR-1 facility and general nuclear 
and radiological practice in Nigeria is directed towards the regulating and mitigation of 
accidental harmful exposure as well as preventing amongst others the malicious use of 
radioactive sources; unauthorized access, damage, loss, theft and unauthorized transfer of nuclear 
materials, services and technology [103]. 
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Safeguards for the NIRR-1 must continue to evolve in the protection of personnel, public and the 
environment. (Figure 6.23.) highlights list of selected nuclides and their corresponding activity 
after 10-years of the unit core operation. During regulatory or IAEA verification, any change in 
background that is different from reported measurement would then be classified as an indication 
of malicious or clandestine operation either by the facility or the state by extension. The list 
could as well serve a measure of emergency preparedness and planning for the facility. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.23. Initial activity of selected radioisotopes and their corresponding initial activities in 
Bq 
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
The security risk and safeguards of the reactor under conversion and the facility were evaluated, 
gaps were identified by comparing this research with other methods adopted in the evaluation of 
security risk. Results obtained from the SCALE and ORIGEN simulation showed at higher 
thermal power of the candidate LEU at 12.5% enrichment produces more amount of weapon-
usable materials from the reactor at varying time intervals of operation.  
The weapon-usable 239Pu balance for LEU fuel compared to the HEU was measured for 4 EFPD 
(one week) and the value obtained in both cases were highlighted in (Figure 6.15.) as 1.49g and 
0.118g respectively. Equally, the 239Pu balance for LEU fuel compared to the HEU measured for 
336 EFPD (one year) and the value obtained in both cases were highlighted in (Figure 6.22.) as 
95.089g and 7.652g respectively due to the increase in 238U isotopic content in HEU from 9.0 
wt% to 87.05 wt% in LEU. Consequently, this noticeable increase will continue to increase 
linearly with each day of operations and subsequently increasing the production of weapon-
usable 239Pu in spent fuel of the LEU. This should be a big source of concern for the enrichment 
reduction program as well as international safeguards and accounting for nuclear materials. 
Similarly, this research showed that methodologies for risk evaluation should not be based on the 
technical background of a would-be adversary as the only measure of risk metric because the 
amount of weapon-usable material may not be adequate to manufacture any weapon but may 
cause consequential environmental challenges if dispersed.  
Based on this, results from this research established a criteria and requirements for risk 
evaluation, security, safeguards that is expected to be of tremendous benefit for a global 
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perspective security, safeguards and general physical protection system to support the ongoing 
enrichment reduction program as well as supporting safeguards for transport security when 
importing the LEU core as well as returning the present HEU core. 
The simulation carried out in this research was targeted towards helping to improve the safety 
performance, inventory, identification of actinides and fission products as well as to support the 
regulatory changes that comes with any conversion process while in addition to the advancement 
of a new legal framework for safeguards and security of nuclear materials, verification, including 
material control and accountancy for the HEU and new LEU in Nigeria. 
Assessments of proliferation risk, to security and safeguards of storage and transportation of 
unirradiated and irradiated HEU and LEU fuel will be improved with the knowledge of quantity 
of materials generated by the simulation for the facility.  
Under this assessment, technical risk, insider risk, outsider collusion, terrorist attack or invasion, 
the vulnerability assessment and above all perceived acquisition pathways for the hypothetical 
facility representative of the NIRR-1 facility were carried out using unique Nigeria country 
circumstances based on existing location of the NIRR-1. Also, the proposed 10MW research reactor will 
be a beneficiation of the security and adversary path analysis developed in this research, because of the 
proposed location in the north central region of Nigeria.  
The result generated from the SCALE and ORIGEN will provide some generic analyses in support of 
the ongoing core conversion of HEU to LEU in Nigeria. It was established that the NIRR-1 
enrichment reduction will attract additional verification challenges based on the HEU core 
removal and the new LEU core replacement because the operating history will change for the 
new LEU fuel as well as the requirements for the security and safeguard from the view of the 
quantity of weapon-usable plutonium that will be left after the conversion. 
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Above all, the cost of the enrichment reduction in each facility must be economically justified 
based on facility assessment.  
 
7.1 Recommendations 
Continuous review of risk assessment is encouraged and should reflect security culture, level of 
education and access to education, government bureaucracy, perceived corruption index that will 
be reflected in the facility services as well as personnel engagement.  
Based on the ongoing enrichment reduction, there must be adequate improvement in the 
regulatory oversight in a way that reflects the present status of the nuclear program in Nigeria. 
Equally, safeguards verification and inspectors’ skills that matches the present operating 
conditions of nuclear services and facilities in Nigeria must be put in place. 
Nigeria as well as other states implementing the enrichment reduction should endeavor to reach 
out to the international community to adapt and domesticate best practices, models and strategies 
that accommodate unique country circumstances, including but not limited to their present fuel 
cycle, plans for future nuclear power plants and research facilities, budget, education 
infrastructure, government bureaucracy, international agreements and information management 
systems for implementing their national safeguards inspection program. 
When considering facility security and safeguards design, it is important to establish a threshold 
at a level that attracts a very high consequence as a means of dissuading a potential insider or an 
invader from accomplishing set ulterior motives at research reactor facilities. Nonetheless, the 
consequence must be such that emergency plan and intervention or arrangements by the facility 
or state can easily be neutralized when activated against the set threshold. 
Domestic safeguards and verification protocols oversite in the application of safeguards and 
material accounting for the facility and country at large must be enhanced. 
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There must be a continuous review of the inventory management system, potential proliferation 
risk assessments, facility specific theft pathways analysis and vulnerability assessment for the 
improvement of detection and interdiction. Equally, there must be a continuous review of the 
inventory management system, potential proliferation risk assessments, facility specific theft 
pathways analysis and vulnerability assessment for the improvement of detection and 
interdiction and counterterrorism policy that considers peculiar facility situation, operation and 
infrastructure. Additionally, the present acquisition pathway analysis (APA) used in this research 
could be adopted to develop information for the State Level Approach (SLA) for the LEU fuel. 
The present safety analysis report is outdated and must be reviewed to reflect the new operating 
history, security and safeguards requirement at the facility 
 
7.2 Future work 
Develop an adequate data profile to mitigate insider and continuous review of the facility design 
basis threat.  
Develop a model that will determine the fuel requirements and consumption rate of the reactor 
under the Material Control and Accounting. 
Based on the challenges of running the SCALE code at full core for the 10-year period of the 
core life, there will be a genuine need for further neutronic analysis to reflect the reality of the 
life time of the fresh core when more accurate operational data from the is available.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Generic Base parameters - HEU (UAl alloy) versus LEU (UO2) candidate fuel. Source: [37]  
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Appendix 2 Categorization of Nuclear Materials 
 
Material  Form Category I Category II Category IIIc 
1. Plutonium a  
 
Unirradiated b 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg 
but more than 
500 g 
 
500 g or less 
but more than 15 g 
2. Uranium-235 (235U)  
 
Unirradiated b 
– Uranium 
enriched to 20% 
235U or more 
5 kg or more  
 
– Uranium 
enriched to 10% 
235U but less 
than 20% 235U 
 
– Uranium 
enriched above 
natural, but less 
than 10% 
235U 
 
 
 
5Kg or more 
 
Less than 5 Kg 
but more than 1 
kg 
 
 
10Kg or more 
 
1Kg or less but 
more than 15 g 
 
 
 
Less than 10 Kg but 
more than 1 Kg 
 
 
 
10 Kg or more 
3. Uranium-233 (233U)  Unirradiated b 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg 
but 
more than 500 g 
 
500 g or less but 
more than 15 g 
4. Irradiated fuel 
(The categorization of 
irradiated fuel in the table 
is based 
on international transport 
considerations. The State 
may 
assign a different category 
for domestic use, storage 
and 
transport taking all 
relevant factors into 
account.) 
  Depleted or 
natural 
uranium, thorium 
or low 
enriched fuel 
(less than 
10% fissile 
content) d, e 
 
 
a. All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238. 
b. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/h. (100 rad/h) at 1 m 
unshielded. 
c. Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with 
prudent management practice. 
d. Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a 
different category of physical protection. 
e. Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category 
level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/h (100 rad/h) at one meter unshielded. 
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